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2I.  Introduction
International law recognizes the fact that the family plays an essential and central role 
in human society.  The family is perceived to be “the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”1  This outlook 
lies at the foundation of the broad protection granted to the family by international 
law.  The right to family life, which has been recognized as a fundamental right in 
international law, is enunciated in all major international instruments and conventions, 
and has also been the subject of a comprehensive discourse in various contexts of 
Israeli law. 
This article deals with the protection of the right to family life under international law 
and its implementation in the State of Israel on three levels: protection of the family 
cell as a single unit (the right to establish a family and, particularly, the right to 
marry); protection of the individuals comprising the family unit (particularly, women 
and children); and protection of the family in special circumstances (such as 
immigration rights). 
Israeli family law may be divided into two parts: the laws of marriage and divorce, 
which are governed exclusively by religious law, on the one hand, and most other 
aspects of family law (including maintenance, child custody, adoption, and 
succession), which are regulated by substantive secular law, on the other hand.2 The 
major inconsistencies between Israeli family law and the provisions of international 
law relating to the right to family life are to be found in those areas governed by 
substantive religious law. Various international conventions that were signed and 
ratified by Israel mandate the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of, inter alia,
1
 Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 
71 (1948) (hereinafter: “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”). Article 23(1) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 (hereinafter: “Covenant 
on Civil Rights”), reiterates that which is stated in the Universal Declaration.  See also Article 10(1) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 
1976 (hereinafter: “Covenant on Social Rights”), which provides: “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize that … [t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society …”.  Similar treatment may be 
found in Article 4 of the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, G.A. res. 2542 (XXIV), 24 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) (“A basic unit of society and the natural 
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members, particularly children and youth”), in 
Article 16 of the European Social Charter, October 18, 1961, E.T.S. 35, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, entered into 
force Feb. 26, 1965 (hereinafter: “European Charter”), and in Article 22 of the Declaration on Social 
Progress and Development, G.A. res. 2542 (XXIV), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/7630 (1969).  Similar provisions may be found in various regional conventions, such as: American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth 
International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to 
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992) (Article VI: 
“Every person has the right to establish a family, the basic element of society, and to receive protection 
thereof”); Article 17(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 (“The family is 
the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State”); Article 18(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981 (“The 
family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take 
care of its physical and moral health”).
2 See A. Rosen-Zvi, “Family and Inheritance Law,” in Introduction to the Law of Israel (A. Shapira and 
K. DeWeitt-Arar, eds., 1995) at 75; P. Shifman, “Family Law in Israel: The struggle between Religious 
and Secular Law”, 24 Is. L. Rev. 537, 538 (1990).
3sex, national origin, race, and religion. However, Israeli law regarding marriage and 
divorce, which is discriminatory in terms of the aforesaid categories, has not been 
affected by the ratification of international conventions. To a certain extent, this is 
because only international customary law automatically becomes part of Israeli law, 
whereas conventional international law (constitutive treaties) becomes part of Israeli 
law only if it is adopted or combined with Israeli law through legislation. While the
Israeli government has ratified the international conventions discussed in this article
(some of which were ratified with specific reservations), they have not been
incorporated into domestic legislation. Thus, they have no formal effect in the Israeli 
legal system and are not applied if they contradict Israeli law. The rights and duties 
enumerated in these conventions, therefore, cannot be directly invoked by individuals, 
and do not fall under the jurisdiction of Israeli courts.3 This article argues that despite 
the fact that international conventions pertaining to the right to family life have not 
been incorporated into Israeli law, the Supreme Court of Israel should give proper 
weight to the right to family life as a fundamental human right grounded in principles 
of international law, and that the Israeli legislature should take the necessary steps to 
bring Israeli family law into conformity with the precepts of international law.
Part II of the article discusses the characteristics of the right to family life and 
examines various definitions of the “family” under international and Israeli law. It 
also examines what it is that the right to family life encompasses and how it should be 
classified within the context of the accepted division into civil and political rights, on
the one hand, and social and economic rights, on the other hand.  It argues that the 
right to family life should not be viewed as limited solely to one category of rights or 
another, since it has the characteristics of both a positive social right as well as those 
of a negative civil right. Part III of the article analyzes the degree of protection 
accorded to the family in various contexts, both in international and Israeli law, 
including: the right of the family to social security, parent-child relations, and 
immigration rights based on family ties. This part concludes that the State of Israel 
provides adequate protection regarding most of these aspects of the right to family 
life, except for its discriminatory practices against Arab Israeli citizens and 
Palestinians in matters relating to immigration and family unification.  
Part IV of the article, which discusses the freedom to marry, argues that Israeli law 
exhibits a particular difficulty in the equal application of the right to family life
insofar as it relates to the right to marry, for the laws of marriage and divorce in Israel 
are governed exclusively by religious law, which discriminates against various groups 
of the population (women, persons without a religion, and persons disqualified for 
religious marriage). International law, on the other hand, dictates the application of 
the right to marriage without discrimination. The conclusion of this part of the article 
is that the only way to guarantee equality within the family context – and to ensure the 
right of every individual to marry, free of the shackles of religious law, as mandated 
by international law – is the introduction of civil marriage in Israel.
3 See Ruth Lapidoth, “International Law within the Israel Legal System,” 24 Isr. L. Rev. 451, 459 
(1990); N. Lerner, “International Law and the State of Israel,” in Introduction to the Law of Israel, Id. 
at 383, 386-387. See also Yaffa Zilbershats, “The Adoption of International Law into Israeli Law: The 
Real is Ideal,” 25 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights, 243 (1996). 
4II. Characteristics of the Right to Family Life
A.  The Right to Family Life – A Fundamental Right
The right to family life is a fundamental right of the highest degree that has attained 
broad and comprehensive protection in international law.  A first expression of the 
recognition of the right to family life as a basic human right, and of the protection of 
the family unit, may be found in Articles 12, 16 and 25 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which state as follows:
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference.
Article 16
1.  Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a 
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution.
2.  Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses.
3.  The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 25
1.  Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services…
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection.
Moreover, the right to family life is enshrined in a significant number of international 
and regional conventions that emphasize the centrality and social importance of the 
family unit, and which list the right to family life as a fundamental right.  First and 
foremost, the right is enunciated both in the Covenant on Social Rights and in the 
Covenant on Civil Rights.  Article 10(1) of the Covenant on Social Rights states that:4
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that … 
[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be 
accorded to the family, which is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society, particularly for its establishment and 
while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent 
children. Marriage must be entered into with the free consent 
of the intending spouses.
4
 Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 1.  The Covenant was ratified by Israel in 1991.
5Similar protection is granted to the institution of the family under Articles 17 and 23 
of the Covenant on Civil Rights; These provisions state, respectively, as follows:5
Article 17
1.  No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honor and reputation.
2.  Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.
Article 23
1.  The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
2.  The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and 
to found a family shall be recognized.
3.  No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses.
4.  States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as 
to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of 
dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of 
any children.
Specific protection for children within the family context may be found in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child6; likewise, the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women includes provisions that grant 
comprehensive protection to women in the context of the family.7  Among regional 
conventions, comprehensive protection for the family institution may be found in the 
European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.8
5
 Covenant on Civil Rights, supra note 1.  The Covenant was ratified by Israel in 1991.
6
 See the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 
at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept.2 1990 (hereinafter: “Convention on the 
Rights of the Child”).  The Convention was ratified by Israel in 1991.  Article 16 of the Convention 
states that: “1. No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation; 2. The 
child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
7
 See Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 
1981 (hereinafter: “Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women”).  The 
Convention was ratified by Israel in 1991.  The State of Israel also ratified the Convention on the 
Nationality of Married Women, 309 U.N.T.S. 65, entered into force Aug. 11, 1958.  Article 3(1) of this 
Convention states that: “Each Contracting State agrees that the alien wife of one of its nationals may, at 
her request, acquire the citizenship of her husband through specially privileged naturalization 
procedures; the grant of such citizenship may be subject to such limitations as may be imposed in the 
interests of national security or public policy.”
8
 See European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, October 4, 
1950 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 (hereinafter: “The European Convention”):           
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
6The right to family life has also been recognized as a fundamental constitutional right 
in Israeli law.  The Israeli legislature has enacted various arrangements intended to 
encourage the family unit.  Thus, for example, within the context of marriage, various 
provisions that have been laid down are designed to foster a caring and intimate 
relationship between spouses, in order to sustain and nurture the family unit.  
Promotion of the emotional relationship between the spouses is achieved, inter alia, 
by the following: granting a right to sick leave in order to care for an ill spouse9; 
giving preference to the request of a foreign spouse to immigrate to and become 
naturalized in the State of Israel, in order to live with his or her spouse10; the lack of 
competence of one spouse to give evidence against the other spouse11; visitation 
rights in prisons,12 etc.  In a similar fashion, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
right to family life as a “particularly important” fundamental right, pointing out that 
every individual has “a basic right to marry and to establish a family.”13  The Court 
has emphasized the social importance of the family unit in a long series of 
judgments,14 adding that Israel is committed to protect the family unit under the 
aforementioned international conventions.15
The Israeli Supreme Court has held that the right to family life – which, according to 
the Court, encompasses the right of an individual to belong to a family unit, the right 
of a couple to marry and live together, the right to bear children, the right of parents to 
raise their children and care for them, and the right of children to grow up with their 
parents – is grounded in the constitutional rights to privacy, self-fulfillment, dignity 
and liberty, which are enshrined in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty: “In an 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 12 – Right to marry
Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.
9
 Section 1 of the Sick Pay (Absence Because of a Spouse’s Sickness) Law, 1998.
10
 Section 7 of the Nationality Law, 1952 (hereinafter: “Nationality Law”) provides that: “The spouse 
of a person who is an Israeli national or who has applied for Israeli nationality … may obtain Israeli 
nationality by naturalization …”.  See also: Section 4A of the Law of Return, 1950 (hereinafter: “Law 
of Return”).  In this matter, the Court has ruled that “an extension of the right of return to family 
members is intended to preserve the unity of the family, one member of which is Jewish”; HCJ 
3648/97 Israel Stamka v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 53(2) 728, 755 (hereinafter: “Stamka”) [All 
citations of Israeli case law refer to Hebrew versions, unless the existence of an English translation is 
indicated].  Regarding limitations on rights of immigration and naturalization in Israel, in various 
contexts, see infra, Part III.D.    
11
 See Section 3 of the Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 1971, which provides that “in a criminal 
trial a spouse shall not be competent to give evidence against the other spouse.”
12
 See Proposed Family Visits in Prison Facilities Law, 2003, of June 23, 2003 (“the link to the family 
unit is considered a basic human need, necessary to the prisoner and his family … these needs are 
among the minimal civilized human conditions of every prisoner who belongs to a family unit”).  The 
Bill may be viewed on the Knesset website <http://www.knesset.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004) 
[Hebrew].
13
 See Stamka, supra note 10, at 781-82.  See also the Court’s remarks in CFH 2401/95 Nachmani v. 
Nachmani, P.D. 50(4) 661, 683 (hereinafter: “Nachmani”): “every person has the right to establish a 
family and to bear children.” 
14
 See, for example, the comments of Justice Barak, regarding the essentiality of the family to the life 
of Israeli society, in HCJ 639/91 Efrat v. Director of Population Registry at Ministry of Interior, P.D. 
47(1) 749, 783 (hereinafter: “Efrat”).
15 Stamka, supra note 10, at 787.
7era in which ‘human dignity’ is a protected fundamental constitutional right, effect 
should be given to the aspiration of a person to fulfill his personal being, and for this 
reason, his desire to belong to the family unit that he considers himself part of should 
be respected.”16
However, although the case law has recognized the right to family life as a 
fundamental constitutional right, it has not been enshrined as a negative civil right in 
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, nor as a positive social right in the 
Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights, in its different versions.17  Among other things, 
the Proposed Law enumerates the right to education, the right to health, and the right 
to housing and social welfare, but surprisingly, it does not include the right to family 
life.18
B.  The Definition and Scope of the Right to Family Life
As indicated by the provisions of the aforementioned international conventions, the 
right to family life encompasses, first and foremost, the following: the right to marry; 
the right to be a parent; equality between the sexes within the family context; 
protection for children within the family context; and the family’s right to privacy. 
The right to family life also includes the right of individuals within the family to not 
be exposed to physical violence or verbal abuse; the right of family members to live 
together in the same country (“family unification”); the right of single-parent families 
and large families to receive state assistance; protection for working mothers and 
safeguards related to pregnancy and childbirth; the right to benefit from the 
educational and cultural resources of the state; the right to an adequate standard of 
living; and the right to family health services.
These rights are not based on a clear, standard definition of the term “family,” but 
rather derive from an individual examination of the various needs and functions of 
the family. Determining the scope of the right to family life, and identifying those 
persons entitled to benefit from it, mainly depends, therefore, on the definition given 
to the term “family.” It appears impossible to find a single, clear, exhaustive and 
standard definition for the concept of the “family” – whether in international law, 
comparative law or Israeli law. Article 10(1) of the Covenant on Social Rights deals 
with “family rights,” but does not define what constitutes a “family”19 (although, a 
16
 CA 7155/96 John Doe v. Attorney General, P.D. 51(1) 160, 175.  An English translation of this 
judgment may be found on the official website of the Israeli Judicial Authority at 
<http://www.court.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004).  
17
 See Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights, 1994 (two versions) and Proposed Basic Law: Social Rights,  
2002.
18
 Even if we do not read a right to family life into the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and 
even if it will not be enshrined in the Basic Law: Social Rights, then, as a basic human right, it is still 
appropriate to examine every provision that infringes on the right to family life according to the 
standards outlined in the limitation clause of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.  See HCJ 
5016/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, P.D. 51(4) 1, 41-3.  An English translation of this 
judgment may be found on the official website of the Israeli Judicial Authority at 
<http://www.court.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004).
19
 The member states that are parties to the Covenant give substance and meaning to the term “family” 
as accepted in each and every country. See P. Alston, “The International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,” Manual on Human Rights Reporting Under Six Major International 
Human Rights Instruments (U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1 (1991)) 39, 57.  In the General Comment of the 
Human Rights Committee of 1990, it was noted “that the concept of the family may differ in some 
8patriarchal view of the family institution may be inferred from the Covenant20).  
Furthermore, a meticulous search in other international conventions, in decisions of 
various international tribunals, and in Israeli law – as well as the law of other legal 
systems – demonstrates that a satisfactory definition for this concept cannot be found.  
The lack of consensus regarding the definition of the family is not evident only in the 
legal realm, but also, and primarily, in the fields of sociology and anthropology.21
The nature and perception of the “family” change from place to place and from time 
to time, and are dependent on points of view as well as on social and cultural 
conditions. Historically, the family has been defined as a permanent, monogamous, 
heterosexual institution, based on marriage, and including a clear division of gender 
roles. Determining who counts as a “family member,” who is a “spouse,” what is a 
“marriage,” and who is considered a “parent,” has long been based on widely 
accepted legal and social perceptions.  However, these perceptions have been 
questioned – mostly in the past few decades – as a result of social, legal and political 
changes.22
From a sociological point of view, it is customary to draw a distinction between the 
“traditional” family (“extended family”) and the “modern” family (“nuclear 
family”),23 and between both of these and the “post-modern” family.24  The 
traditional family and the modern family are based on ties of blood and marriage, and 
they differ in regard to the degrees of relation included in the definition of the term.  
The post-modern family encompasses also relations that are not based on blood or 
marriage (such as, unmarried heterosexual couples and same-sex partners), “absent” 
family relations (such as single-parent families), and the “bi-nuclear” family, where 
respects from State to State, and even from region to region within a State, and that it is therefore not 
possible to give the concept a standard definition.”  See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 
19, Article 23 (Thirty-ninth session, 1990), Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 28 
(1994)) (hereinafter: “G.C. 19”).  Even prior to this, the UN Human Rights Committee stated that the 
term “family” in this Covenant, as in other conventions, should be interpreted as including: “All those 
comprising the family as understood in the society of the State Party concerned” (Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 16, (Twenty-third session, 1988), Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (U.N. Doc. 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 21 (1994).
20
 Despite the existence of provisions that deal with equal rights for women (see infra, Part IV.C), the 
man is the universal subject of the Covenant.  Article 11 of the Covenant on Social Rights provides that 
“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of 
living for himself and his family …” (emphasis added).  As such, the Covenant presumes that it is the 
man who requires an adequate standard of living for his family, an assumption based on the perception 
that it is the man who heads the family.  D. Otto, “’Gender Comment’: Why does the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights need a General Comment on Women?,” 14 Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law 1, 19 (2002).
21
 For different and varied definitions of the concept of the “family” in the fields of sociology and 
anthropology, see R. Bar-Yosef, “Sociology of the Family in view of Social Changes and 
Biotechnological Innovations,” 38(1) Megamot 5 (1996) [Hebrew].
22
 N. Bala & R.J. Bromwich, “Context and Inclusivity in Canada's Evolving Definition of the Family,” 
16 International Journal of Law Policy and the Family 145 (2002).
23
 See Z. Falk, Marriage Law (1983) 11 [Hebrew].  The accepted definition of the family in the field of 
sociology, since the 1940s and up to this day and age, is that of Murdock, who defines the nuclear 
family as one that includes a married man and woman and their offspring: G.P. Murdock, Social 
Structure (New-York, 1949) 1-2.  Bar-Yosef argues that Murdock’s model is incompatible with the 
characteristics of the post-modern family; see Bar-Yosef, supra note 21.
24
 For a discussion of the characteristics of the post-modern family in the State of Israel, see S. Fogiel-
Bijaoui, “Families in Israel: Familism and Post-Modernism,” Sex, Gender and Politics (1999) 107 
[Hebrew].
9parents have separated and established new nuclear families.  While, in reality, there 
is no denying the existence of many different sorts of family units, it would appear 
that Israeli law still essentially regards the nuclear family – based on a lawful 
marriage between a man and a woman who have common children, whether 
biological or adopted – as the normative family model, and finds it difficult to 
recognize the wide variety of families that actually exist.25
As far as Israeli legislation is concerned, different definitions for the term “family” 
may be found in various laws, the scope of the definition varying from law to law, 
depending on the purpose of the statute.  Furthermore, since the definition of 
“family” is a functional context-dependent definition, it is even possible to find 
different definitions for this concept within the same statute.26  Some laws adopt a 
broad approach, while other statutes adopt a narrow approach.27  Examples of a broad 
definition for the concept of the “family” may be found in the Prevention of Family 
Violence Law, 199128 and the Family Courts Law, 1995.29  The definition of a 
25
 Such recognition finds only partial expression, mainly in the area of social rights.  See, for example, 
the Single-Parent Families Law, 1992 (hereinafter: “Single-Parent Families Law”), which grants 
various benefits to a single-parent, such as preferential admissions to day-care centers or an increased 
state loan for housing purposes; in a similar fashion, same-sex partnerships have been accorded limited 
recognition that finds expression in the right of a same-sex partner to receive various employment 
benefits routinely granted to partners of a different sex.  See HCJ 721/94 El Al v. Danilowitz, P.D. 
48(5) 749 (hereinafter: “Danilowitz”).  An English translation of this judgment may be found on the 
official website of the Israeli Judicial Authority at <http://www.court.gov.il> (visited April 25, 2004). 
The legal conception of the nuclear family as the normative model, up to the present day, is reflected, 
for example, in the comments of Justice Porat in FA (Tel-Aviv) 10/99 Jane Doe v. Attorney General, 
(unpublished), Takdin - District Court 2001(2) 125 (hereinafter: “Jane Doe I”), who refused to view a 
lesbian couple and their children as a family unit and to grant them second-parent adoption, ruling that: 
“the children in question have mothers and no one has expressed any doubt as to their fitness to raise 
their children.  Each one of the mothers chose to bring her children into the world without the 
participation of a man in her life.  What is lacking for these children (if it is indeed lacking) is a 
father, but definitely not another mother” (emphasis added); at para. 18 of the judgment.  See also 
B. Schereschewsky, Family Law (Fourth Edition, 1993) 1 [Hebrew], in which Prof. Schereschewsky 
defines the institution of the “family” as follows: “A family for the purposes of family law means all 
those persons who are related to one another by blood or by marriage.”
26
 In this matter, compare, for example, the definition of “family relation” in Section 174A(g) of the 
Municipalities Ordinance (New Version), which deals with restrictions on the employment of a family 
relation (“‘family relation’ – a spouse; a parent; a son or daughter and their spouses; a brother or sister 
and their children; a brother-in-law or sister-in-law; an uncle or aunt; a father-in-law or mother-in-law; 
a son-in-law or daughter-in-law; a grandson or granddaughter; including step-relations or adoptive 
relations”), to the definition of “family member” in Section 235A(a) of the same Ordinance (“a spouse, 
a child, a parent, a brother or sister, a grandson or granddaughter, a great-grandson or great-
granddaughter”).
27
 Regarding this distinction, see the Report by the State of Israel to the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Ministry of Justice: Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1998) E/1990/5/Add.39(1) (hereinafter: “Israeli Report to the 
UN Committee”).  The Report may be viewed at:
 <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.1990.5.Add.39(1).En?OpenDocument> (visited April 
25, 2004).
28
 Section 1 of the Prevention of Family Violence Law, 1991 (hereinafter: “Prevention of Family 
Violence Law”) defines “family member” as follows: “(1) a spouse, a parent or the spouse of a parent, 
a parent of a spouse or the parent’s spouse, a grandfather or a grandmother, an offspring or the 
offspring of a spouse, a brother or a sister, a brother-in-law or a sister-in-law, an uncle or an aunt, a 
nephew or a niece; (2) a person responsible for the sustenance, health, education or welfare of a minor 
or incapacitated person residing with him, and a minor or incapacitated person residing with a person 
responsible for him, as stated.”  The statute also provides that the term “family member” includes 
“someone who was a family member in the past,” and that the term “spouse” includes “a common-law 
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“family member” in these two statutes includes, inter alia, a “reputed spouse” (a 
category akin to common law spouses) and a former spouse, children (including the 
children of a spouse), a parent and the spouse of a parent, the parents of a spouse and 
their spouses, a grandfather and a grandmother, brothers and sisters, and brothers-in-
law and sisters-in-law.30  This broad definition is not based only on marital relations 
and blood ties, but also on relations between reputed spouses and their families.  On 
the other hand, there are statutes that adopt a narrow language insofar as it relates to 
the definition of a “family member.”  The narrow definition is solely based on blood 
ties and marital relations, and does not include, for example, a reputed spouse, or 
even the family of a spouse.  Thus, for example, the National Insurance Law 
(Consolidated Version), 1995 (hereinafter: the “National Insurance Law”), provides 
that a “family member” only includes “one of the parents, a child, a grandchild, a 
brother or a sister.”31  In a similar fashion, the Equal Opportunities in Employment 
Law, 1988, provides that a “family member” is “a spouse, a parent, a child, a 
grandchild, a brother, a sister, or a spouse of any of these.”32  Definitions that are 
narrow, to one degree or another, may be found in a long list of additional statutes.33
In contrast to the variety of statutory definitions of the “family,” it is difficult to find 
an attempt to define this concept in Israeli case law and legal literature.34  It seems 
spouse.”  This definition also applies to several other statutes: see, for example, Section 3 of the Law 
Against Stalking, 2001.
29
 Section 1 of the Family Courts Law, 1995 (hereinafter: “Family Courts Law”) defines a “family 
member” as: a spouse – including a common-law spouse, a former spouse, a spouse the marriage to 
whom has been dissolved – provided that the subject of the claim derives from the relationship between 
them during the period when they were a couple; a child, including the child of a spouse; parents, the 
parents of a spouse or their spouses; a grandchild; the parents of parents; brothers and sisters, or the 
brothers and sisters of a spouse.  Furthermore, the term “parent” is defined as “including an adoptive 
parent or a guardian.”
30
 The Prevention of Family Violence Law even includes uncles and aunts, and nieces and nephews, 
while the Family Courts Law also includes grandchildren as “family members.”  In keeping with its 
objective, the Prevention of Family Violence Law provides a broad definition that even applies to the 
relationship between someone who is responsible for a minor/incapacitated person residing with him or 
her and the minor/incapacitated person.
31
 Section 1 of the National Insurance Law.  This definition is identical to that found in Section 1 of the 
Planning and Building Law, 1965.
32
 Section 21(a)(1) of the Equal Opportunities in Employment Law, 1988.  For a similar definition, see 
the Victims of Road Accidents (Assistance to Family Members) Law, 2002: “’family member’ – a 
spouse, a child, a parent, a brother or a sister, or another family member who was dependent upon the 
road accident victim.”
33
 See, for example, Section 8(7) of the National Health Insurance Law, 1994, which defines “family” 
as follows: “An individual and his spouse and their children up to the age of 18, or an individual and 
his children up to the age of 18.”  Also, see and compare Section 17A(b) of the Government 
Companies Law, 1975; Section 351(e) of the Penal Law, 1977 (hereinafter: “Penal Law”); Section 1 of 
the Fallen Soldiers’ Families (Pensions and Rehabilitation) Law, 1950; Section 1 of the Invalids 
(Pensions and Rehabilitation) Law, 1959 (Consolidated Version); Section 28F of the Political Parties 
Law, 1992; Section 2 of the Crime Victims’ Rights Law, 2001.  See also Proposed Basic Law: The 
Family, drafted by the New Family Organization <http://www.newfamily.org.il> (visited April 25, 
2004), which defines “family” as follows: “(1) married couples; (2) unmarried adult couples unrelated 
by blood who live together in the same home, maintain a joint household and are mutually committed 
to a shared life; (3) an adult and a minor maintaining a joint household, where the adult is the parent or 
legal guardian of the minor.”
34
 While it is extremely difficult to find a clear definition for the term “family” in Israeli case law and 
legal literature, a very comprehensive discussion may be found, in this context, regarding the definition 
of the term “spouse,” which constitutes a basic element of the “family.”  Opinions are divided on this 
subject and various questions remain unanswered, such as: For the purposes of family law, as well as in 
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that the courts, as well as most legal scholars assume that the definition of the family 
is obvious; in fact, they appear to be referring to the nuclear family.  Thus, for 
example, in the Ofri case, Justice Orr held that for the purposes of the matter in 
question “there is no reason to interpret this broad term, ‘family,’ the meaning of 
which is known to all, as if it only refers to this or that specific person” (emphasis 
added).35  Nevertheless, on this subject, the Israeli courts usually follow the lead of 
the legislature; in other words, when it comes to the meaning of the term “family,” 
the court adopts a functional approach, taking into account the purposes of the 
relevant statute.36
C.  The Right to Family Life: A Social-Civil Right
Traditionally, international legal scholars have distinguished between the 
characteristics of the rights enunciated in the Covenant on Civil Rights and the 
characteristics of the rights enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights.  Thus, for 
example, Scott has proposed the distinctions listed in the following table:37








“Aspirations” or “Goals” “Real” or “Legal” rights
The most prevalent distinction is that found in the first line of the table: it is 
customary to classify the rights enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights as 
“positive” rights, which necessitate the intervention of state authorities for their 
implementation (such as providing minimal means of subsistence), and the rights 
enunciated in the Covenant on Civil Rights as “negative” rights, which mandate state 
noninterference, or an obligation to refrain from activity that may infringe on a right 
(such as freedom of expression).38  These distinctions have been criticized and it has 
other legal contexts, should a common-law partner be included within the definition of the term 
“spouse” that appears in legislation?; Or: Is a same-sex partner also a “spouse” for the purpose of 
recognizing various rights emanating from this status?  See, for example: Danilowitz, supra note 25, at 
785-86; CA 2000/97 Lindorn v. Karnit – Road Accident Victims Compensation Fund, P.D. 55(1) 12; 
M. Shava, “The ‘Unmarried Wife’” 3 Iyunei Mishpat 484 (1973) [Hebrew].
35
 CA 449, 464/88 Ofri v. Perlman, P.D. 45(1) 600, 609.  Similarly, in most basic textbooks dealing 
with family law in Israel, it is impossible to find a definition for the term.  See, for example, P. 
Shifman, Family Law in Israel (Second Edition, 1995, Volume I) [Hebrew]; A. Rosen-Zvi, Israeli 
Family Law: The Sacred and the Secular (1990) [Hebrew]; M. Shava, The Personal Law in Israel
(Fourth Edition, 2001) [Hebrew]. 
36
 Israeli Report to the UN Committee, supra note 27, at 76.
37
 C. Scott, “The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion 
of the International Covenants on Human Rights,” 27 Osgd Hall L.J. 768, 833 (1989).
38
 For a discussion of additional distinctions between social rights and civil rights, including a survey of 
their different historical development, the hierarchy between them, and their different political and 
theoretical characteristics, see M.C.R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford, 1995) 8-9.  Regarding the distinction 
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been argued that the differences between the two categories of rights are not at all 
obvious or unequivocal.39  And, indeed, there are political rights with characteristics 
found in the right column of the table (for example, affirmative action) and social 
rights with characteristics found in the left column of the table (for instance, the right 
of association and the right to strike); furthermore, there are rights with 
characteristics in both columns of the table, their exact nature varying according to 
the context in which they are being discussed (like the prohibition against 
discrimination).40  In this regard, even if we ignore the criticism and adhere to the 
classic distinction between social rights and civil rights, not only would we find that 
the right to family life is enunciated in both the Covenant on Civil Rights and the 
Covenant on Social Rights,41 but also that this right, in its various aspects, has a 
mixed nature: both civil and social.  Several aspects of the right to family life have 
more of a negative-civil nature than a positive-social nature, such as the demand for 
recognition of the family’s right to privacy, as well as the right to marry and to 
establish a family, and even the demand for equal rights between the sexes within the 
context of the institution of marriage – all “legal” rights that may be implemented 
immediately, without an investment of resources, and which mainly entail 
noninterference by the state in the individual’s freedom of choice.42  On the other 
between positive and negative human rights in international law, see, for example: C. Baez & others, 
“Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights,” 8 Yearbook of Int'l Law 183, 223-24 (1999/2000); J. 
Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder, 1993) 26.
39
 There are those who argue that, ultimately, all human rights require the state to act in a positive 
manner in order to ensure that all individuals have the opportunity to fully benefit from them.  See A. 
Hendriks, “The Right to Health Promotion and Protection of Women's Right to Sexual and 
Reproductive Health Under International Law: The Economic Covenant and the Women's 
Convention,” 44 Am. U.L. Rev. 1123, 1133 (1995).
40
 See, for example: G. McGregor, “The International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural 
Rights: Will it Get its Day in Court?,” 28 Man. L.J. 321, 334 (2002).
41
 See Articles 17 and 23 of the Covenant on Civil Rights and Article 10 of the Covenant on Social 
Rights.  It is interesting to note that Article 10 of the Covenant on Social Rights provides that “the 
widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family,” while it is customary to 
interpret the term “protection” as an obligation on the part of the state to prevent interference, by third 
parties, with the family institution; according to this interpretation, the wording of Article 10 is narrow 
and only relates to the protection of the family in the sense of preventing interference, by certain 
individuals, with the right of other individuals to family life.  See Craven, supra note 38, at 109.  If that 
is the case, then the right to family life in the Covenant on Social Rights may be interpreted as a right 
that is mainly negative in character.  However, it should be remembered that, like the rest of the 
provisions in the Covenant, Article 10 is also subordinate to the general implementation clause, Article 
2(1), which imposes positive obligations on the state.  Indeed, Article 10 of the Covenant does not 
make use of the word “right,” and, therefore, prima facie, Article 2(1) does not apply to it.  This 
interpretation is unreasonable, and Article 2(1) should be read as also applying to Article 10 of the 
Covenant, both in view of the intention of the Covenant’s drafters to lay down binding legal 
obligations, and because it is not appropriate to interpret Article 10 in a different manner from the rest 
of the Covenant’s provisions, since Article 2(1) was designed to lay down the responsibility of the 
states regarding all provisions of the Covenant.  Moreover, the Economic and Social Committee, in its 
guidelines for the submission of reports, expressly used the term “rights” when it referred to Article 10 
of the Covenant.  See Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The 
nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, para.1 of the Covenant) (Fifth session, 1990), Compilation 
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (U.N. 
Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 45 (1994)).  Reporting Guidelines, UN Doc.E/1991/23, Annex IV, 97-9, UN 
ESCOR, Supp. (No. 3) (1991) (hereinafter: “G.C. 3”); Craven, supra note 38, at 135.
42
 Within the context of the right to privacy, as well as the right to equality, a guarantee of full 
enjoyment of the right necessitates the prior implementation of administrative safeguards, legal and 
otherwise, against the possibility of an infringement of this right.  That is to say, the state must also 
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hand, other aspects of the right to family life have more of a positive-social nature 
than a negative-civil nature: in this context, it is possible to include the family unit’s 
right to receive economic assistance and social welfare from the state (such as 
“maternity insurance”) – a right that necessitates positive intervention on the part of 
the state, entailing an investment of resources, whereas both the manner and the rate 
of implementation are dependent on the economic capability of the state.  In my 
view, it is not advisable to dissociate the civil characteristics from the social 
characteristics of the right to family life,43 since those are different aspects of the 
same material right.  Therefore, for the remainder of this article, I will discuss both 
the “negative” and the “positive” aspects of the right to family life.  
III. Protection of the Right to Family Life in Various Fields – International and 
Israeli Law
A.  Protection of the Family Unit - General
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which serves as a 
supervising body for the implementation of the Covenant on Social Rights, provides 
clarifications, from time to time, regarding the interpretation of various provisions in 
the Covenant (General Comments).  However, the right to family life, enunciated in 
Article 10 of the Covenant, has yet to be discussed by the Committee or to be 
interpreted by international judicial tribunals.44  This is one of the reasons for the fact 
that the appropriate degree of protection for the family unit, mandated by the 
Covenant on Social Rights, has not been clarified to this very day.  In any case, even 
regarding those matters that the Committee discusses, and on which it publishes a 
General Comment, its determinations are not considered a binding interpretation and, 
therefore, the interpretation of the Covenant is generally left to the discretion of the
individual states.
In Israel, as in most countries, it is customary, in principle, to view the family cell as 
an independent unit immune from state interference.  In the words of the Supreme 
Court, this approach is grounded in the recognition that the family is “the most basic 
and ancient social unit in human history which was, is, and will be the foundation 
take “positive” steps in order to guarantee the existence of a right that is, primarily, “negative.”  See 
Hendriks, supra note 39, at 1133-34.
43
 It may be argued that, even though the right to family life is referred to in a similar fashion in both 
the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Covenant on Social Rights, these should not necessarily be 
viewed as overlapping references, but rather as referring to different aspects of the right.  That is to say, 
the right should be interpreted according to the context in which it appears.  Therefore, to the extent 
that the right to family life is mentioned in the Covenant on Social Rights, it should be interpreted as 
requiring economic support for the family unit (i.e., its interpretation should be limited to the socio-
economic context); and when it appears in the Covenant on Civil Rights, it should be interpreted as 
referring to the civil characteristics of the right to family life.
44
 An attempt to give substance to the right to family life may be found, primarily, in judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  For a discussion of this attempt, see infra text accompanying notes 
69-70 and 128-32.  Perhaps the lack of a special legal discussion regarding Article 10 of the Covenant 
by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights may be explained by the fact that the 
right to family life is a broad right encompassing numerous secondary rights that sometimes overlap 
other rights.
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that serves and ensures the existence of human society.”45  The Court has further held 
that: 46
In principle, the autonomy to establish a family, to plan a family 
and to bear children is a matter of personal privacy.  Human liberty 
encompasses the freedom of independent choice on matters of 
marriage, divorce, childbirth, and any other private matter within 
the sphere of personal autonomy…. “The state does not interfere in 
this sphere except for reasons of special weight justified by the 
need to protect the right of the individual or a significant public 
interest”…. The aspiration to minimize state involvement in 
relations within the family unit, whether by direct intervention or 
by means of the legal system, emphasizes the unit’s right to 
autonomy, which is protected from interference both in the 
relations between the family unit and the state, as well as in the 
relations between the different members of the family unit.  The 
situations requiring intervention are usually sensitive and complex, 
and it is needed when a crisis in the family unit has occurred that 
calls for state intervention through the courts in order to obtain a 
resolution that the parties themselves have failed to achieve.
The tendency to minimize state intervention in family relations is, therefore, 
grounded in recognition of the privacy and autonomy of the family.  For example, the
Supreme Court has ruled that “the parents are autonomous in reaching decisions in 
everything regarding their children – education, lifestyle, place of residence, and so 
forth, and the intervention of society and the state in these decisions is an exception 
that must be justified.”47  Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a growing tendency of 
increased intervention in the autonomy of the family unit as part of the 
democratization and individualization processes taking place in the modern family.48
Such intervention is perceived of as justifiable when the familial environment 
becomes oppressive and coercive.49  Thus, for example, the Prevention of Family 
Violence Law allows for the issuance of a protection order prohibiting a person from 
entering a dwelling where a family member resides or from being found within a 
certain distance from such a dwelling, or from harassing a family member in any 
manner and in any place.50  Furthermore, and as will be discussed below, the 
requirement of protection for the right to family life is not limited to a demand for 
state noninterference in family life or for intervention at a time of crisis, but also 
includes the need to support the family unit for the purpose of its subsistence, welfare 
and development, as well as a demand that the state identify those persons who are 
entitled to benefit, without discrimination, from the definition of “family.”
45
 CA 488/77 John Doe v. Attorney General, P.D. 32(3) 421, 434.
46
 CA 5587/93 Nachmani v. Nachmani, P.D. 49(1) 485, 499, 501.
47
 CA 577/83 Attorney General v. Jane Doe, P.D. 38(1) 461, 468, 485 (hereinafter: “Jane Doe II”).
48
 See Fogiel-Bijaoui, supra note 24, at 109.
49 Id., at 127.
50
 Section 2 of the Prevention of Family Violence Law, supra note 28.  Another example is the power 
to temporarily or permanently remove children from the custody of their parents, by means of an 
adoption order pursuant to the Adoption of Children Law, 1981 (hereinafter: “Adoption of Children 
Law”) and the Youth (Care and Supervision) Law, 1960 (hereinafter: “Youth Law”).
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We will focus below on the legal protection afforded the right to family life, to the 
extent that this relates to the entire family, as a single unit.  In this context, we will 
discuss several specific rights derived from the right to family life, where reference to 
the term “family” means the family in all its forms: the nuclear family, the extended 
family and even “alternative” family ties.  Nevertheless, as we shall see, most of the 
legal protection and recognition is granted to the nuclear family, whether in regard to 
the relations between (heterosexual) spouses or the relations between parents and 
their children.                
B.  The Right of the Family to Social Security and Means of Subsistence
Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, among other 
things, that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself and of his family … motherhood and childhood are entitled 
to special care and assistance.  All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection.”  Article 11(1) of the Covenant on Social Rights 
similarly provides that “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, 
including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of 
living conditions.  The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the 
realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of 
international co-operation based on free consent.”  Article 10(1) of this Covenant also 
mandates that the state accord protection and assistance to the family, to the widest 
extent possible, “particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the 
care and education of dependent children.”  Sub-articles (2) and (3) add provisions 
requiring that special protection be granted to women and children, as follows:51
 (2) Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a 
reasonable period before and after childbirth. During such 
period working mothers should be accorded paid leave or 
leave with adequate social security benefits.
(3) Special measures of protection and assistance should be 
taken on behalf of all children and young persons without 
any discrimination for reasons of parentage or other 
conditions. Children and young persons should be protected 
from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in 
work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or 
likely to hamper their normal development should be 
punishable by law. States should also set age limits below 
which the paid employment of child labor should be 
prohibited and punishable by law.
These provisions are designed to encourage the international community to 
continuously raise the standard of living of family members, to ensure their economic 
well-being and social development, and to create adequate conditions for the proper 
establishment and functioning of the family unit.  These declarations are highly 
51
 Covenant on Social Rights, supra note 1.
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significant in view of the tremendous resources at the disposal of the international 
community, on the one hand, and the great poverty suffered by many families 
throughout the world, on the other hand.52  These provisions demonstrate that, within 
the context of the economic and social rights of the family, special emphasis has been 
placed on the protection and assistance that should be granted to working mothers.53
It appears that the State of Israel, primarily through its social security system, affords 
extensive support and protection to working mothers during pregnancy, childbirth 
and post-childbirth care.  As mandated by Article 10(2) of the Covenant on Social 
Rights, the Employment of Women Law, 1954 (hereinafter: “Employment of Women 
Law”) grants women the right (as well as the obligation) to take paid maternity leave 
for a period of 12 weeks (while providing the opportunity for fathers to take half of 
the maternity leave in lieu of the mother); the statute provides that an employer 
cannot dismiss a female employee during her pregnancy, save under a permit from 
the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs.54  The National Insurance Law provides a 
series of benefits under the heading “maternity insurance,” including free 
hospitalization for childbirth, maternity grants (and if more than two children are 
born in a single birth – a maternity pension), maternity allowances for working 
mothers during their maternity leave, and high risk pregnancy benefits.55
C.  The Parent-Child Relationship
We have seen above that Article 10(3) of the Covenant on Social Rights provides, 
inter alia, that “[s]pecial measures of protection and assistance should be taken on 
behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for reasons of 
parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons should be protected from 
economic and social exploitation.”  Additional comprehensive safeguards for 
children, within the context of the family, may be found in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.  Article 5 of this Convention provides that “States Parties shall 
respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents … to provide, in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention.”  Article 18(1) further provides that: 56
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of 
the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for 
the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the 
case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for 
the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of 
the child will be their basic concern.
52
 A. Belembaogo, The Family in International and Regional Human Rights Instruments (New York, 
1999), at 7.
53
 Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, supra note 7, 
which deals with equal employment opportunities, is also designed to enable women to maintain their 
economic independence.  Therefore, the international community recognizes that family responsibility 
does not need to adversely affect the equal opportunities of women within the context of the labor 
market.
54
 See Sections 6 and 9 of the Employment of Women Law.
55
 Regarding the history of maternity insurance in Israel, and for details about the level of benefits, see 
Israeli Report to the UN Committee, supra note 27, at 83-85.
56
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 6. 
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The State of Israel grants various social benefits to families with children, including a 
children’s pension from the National Insurance Institute, and economic assistance for 
single-parent families, under both the Single-Parent Families Law and the Assurance 
of Income Law, 1980.      
Alongside the protection and assistance granted by the state to children, within the 
family context, the law recognizes the right to parenthood – a right leading to the 
imposition of various duties on parents vis-à-vis their children.  The Supreme Court 
has recognized that “the right to parenthood is a fundamental human right to which 
every individual is entitled.”57  In a similar fashion, the Court held  that: 58
The right of parents to raise and educate their children as they see 
fit is a fundamental constitutional right, a natural right inherent in 
and stemming from the relationship between parents and their 
offspring.  The family context does not stand apart from the 
constitutional system, but is an integral part thereof.  Within the 
context of the family unit, parents are granted rights recognized 
and protected by constitutional law.  The right of parents to have 
custody of their children and to raise them, with all this entails, is a 
natural and primary constitutional right – an expression of the 
natural connection between parents and their children [cite 
omitted].
As stated in the Israeli Report to the UN Committee on the Implementation of the 
Covenant on Social Rights, “the fundamental assumption of Israeli law is that the 
initial obligation to support family members lies with the family itself”; whereas this 
principle is enshrined, inter alia, in the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, 
which states that parents, as the natural guardians of their minor children, have “the 
right to fulfill their duties” vis-à-vis their children,59 which include fulfilling their 
needs and seeing to their education, their studies and the preservation of their 
property.60  Nevertheless, when the need arises, and in accordance with the primary 
principle of the “best interests of the child,” various statutes grant the state authority 
to intervene in order to ensure the welfare of a minor; for instance, the power to 
temporarily or permanently remove a child from the parents’ custody by means of an 
adoption order under the Adoption of Children Law and the Youth Law.  
Furthermore, the Penal Law imposes criminal sanctions on parents for neglecting, 
assaulting or abusing their children, physically, emotionally or sexually.61
57
 CA 451/88 John Does v. State of Israel, P.D. 44(1) 330, 337.
58
 CA 2266/93 John Does v. Richard Roe, P.D. 49(1) 221, 235 (hereinafter: “John Does”).
59 ET 1/81 Nagar v. Nagar, P.D. 38(1) 365, 393; John Does, supra note 58, at 239-40.
60
 Israeli Report to the UN Committee, supra note 27, at 80.
61
 The “best interests of the child” principle also dictates, prima facie, that children not be harmed by 
the status or acts of their parents.  However, the application of religious law in matters of personal 
status, which we will discuss in more detail below, also harms certain groups of children as a result of 
the acts or status of their parents.  Thus, for example, according to Jewish Law, a child born to a Jewish 
mother and a non-Jewish father is not legally related to the father; likewise, a child born to a married 
woman by a man who is not her husband is considered a mamzer [this term translates to English as 
“bastard”, and it refers to the offspring of a forbidden union], something that imposes serious 
limitations on the child’s legal capacity to marry, since a mamzer is forbidden to marry a Jew and may 
only marry another mamzer or a non-Jew.  See C. Shalev, “Freedom of Contract for Marriage and a 
Shared Life,” in Women’s Status in Israeli Law and Society 459-60, 465, 479 (1995) [Hebrew].
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Just as various restrictions are placed on the right to marriage (see discussion below), 
so too are various restrictions placed on the right to parenthood (in its “positive” 
sense).  The State of Israel grants extensive recognition to the right to parenthood, 
insofar as it relates to married heterosexual couples, and even provides support and 
assistance to married couples unable to bear children.  Thus, for example, the 
Adoption of Children Law states the principle whereby “[a]n adoption shall only be 
made by a man and his wife jointly.”62  In a similar fashion, the Surrogacy 
Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law, 1996 only allows 
a man and a woman who are a couple to benefit from surrogacy arrangements.63  The 
Supreme Court has refused to rule that these laws are discriminatory against 
unmarried persons.64  Therefore, unmarried couples (or, in the case of surrogacy –
those who are not reputed spouses), single persons and same-sex couples may benefit 
from the “negative” aspects of the right to parenthood, but not from its “positive” 
aspects.65
D.  Immigration Rights and “Family Unification”
One of the areas which reflect on the degree of commitment by the state to the right 
to family life is immigration policy.  In this context, a distinction should be made 
between the immigration of all family members (usually, the migration of workers 
and their families from one state to another66) and “family unification,”67 i.e., the 
62
 Section 3 of the Adoption of Children Law.
63
 Section 1 of the Surrogacy Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of the Child) Law, 1996 
(hereinafter: “Surrogacy Agreements Law”), defines those entitled to benefit from surrogacy 
arrangements as follows: “‘intended parents’ – a man and a woman who are a couple, who enter into a 
contract with a surrogate mother for the purpose of bearing a child.” For further discussion of the 
Surrogacy Agreements Law, see Rhona Schuz, “The Right to Parenthood: Surrogacy and Frozen 
Embryos,” in Bainham, A. (ed.) The International Survey of Family Law, p. 237 (1996)
64
 See HCJ 2458/01 New Family v. Approvals Committee for Surrogate Motherhood Agreements, 
Ministry of Health, P.D. 57(1) 419 (hereinafter: “New Family”), in which the Court deliberated the 
question of the right of a single woman to use the services of a surrogate mother under the Surrogacy 
Agreements Law, holding that the statute does not grant such a right; CA 1165/01 Jane Doe v. Attorney 
General, P.D. 57(1) 69, which dealt with the question of whether the term “spouse” in Section 3 of the 
Adoption of Children Law also includes a common-law spouse.  In the end, the question was left for 
further consideration, and the Court did not even rule that common-law spouses are entitled to jointly 
adopt a foreign child.  To the extent that this relates to the right of one partner of a same-sex couple to 
adopt the biological child of the other, the District Court has ruled that the law does not permit such an 
adoption; see Jane Doe I, supra note 25; an appeal of this judgment is pending before the Supreme 
Court.  In HCJ 1779/99 Berner-Kadish v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 54(2) 368, the Court ordered the 
Ministry of Interior to register a lesbian couple as the dual mothers of the biological child of one of 
them, who was adopted by the other in California.  A motion has been submitted for a further hearing 
of this decision, and it is pending before an expanded panel of the Supreme Court.
65
 Unlike adoption and surrogacy, which, as stated, are restricted to a man and a woman who are a 
couple (to the extent that this relates to adoption, even individuals are entitled to adopt a child under 
certain conditions), the Supreme Court nullified the policy that discriminated between married and 
single women (including lesbian women), regarding the unrestricted access to artificial insemination 
services.  See HCJ 2078/96 Weitz v. Minister of Health (unpublished) (hereinafter: “Weitz”).  
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision in New Family, supra note 64, to not allow a single woman to 
avail herself of a surrogacy arrangement under the Surrogacy Agreements Law, is in conflict with its 
previous ruling in Weitz.
66
 A discussion of the subject of the migration of workers with their families is beyond the scope of this 
article.  In this matter, there is a special convention that regulates the rights of the families of migrant 
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immigration of one spouse in order to live together with the other spouse, or the 
immigration of children/parents in order to live with or near their parents/children.  In 
this article, we will deal with the second type of immigration, i.e. family unification 
aimed at protecting the right to family life, in two main contexts: first, the 
immigration rights of a foreign spouse, based on marriage; second, the immigration 
rights of foreign parents or children, based on the parent-child relationship.
1.  Immigration Rights Based on Marriage
The principle whereby the state grants immigration rights to a foreign spouse does 
not stem from the recognition of a duty on the part of the state vis-à-vis the foreigner, 
but rather from its obligation to recognize and enforce the right of the spouse who is a 
citizen to enjoy the benefits of family life in his or her own country – if the foreign 
spouse is not permitted to immigrate, then, in effect, the spouse who is a national is 
forced to leave the country in order to realize his or her right to family life.  
Therefore, granting immigration rights to the foreign spouse primarily constitutes 
recognition of the right to family life of the spouse who is a citizen.68  The European 
Court of Human Rights has long recognized that the right to family life enshrined in 
Article 8 of the European Convention may impose positive duties on the state in the 
field of immigration.69  Nevertheless, the Court has allowed the state broad discretion 
to choose which foreigners will enter into or be deported from its territory, and 
greater weight is sometimes given to this prerogative than to the right to family life. 70
The Israeli Supreme Court has also been asked to deliberate this issue in a series of 
cases.  A comprehensive discussion regarding the discretion of state authorities in 
granting citizenship to the foreign spouse of an Israeli national may be found in the 
Stamka case,71 which debated the reasonable basis for the Ministry of Interior policy 
regarding the naturalization process for a non-Jewish foreign spouse married to a 
Jewish Israeli in a “mixed marriage.”  Under this policy, which had been in effect 
since 1995, a non-Jewish foreign spouse, who had married a Jewish Israeli citizen 
workers.  See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990).
67
 In this context, I use the term “family unification” in its broad sense, i.e., every case involving the 
immigration of a person so that he or she may live in the same country together with his or her family 
members.  Further on, I will discuss the meaning of the term in the Israeli context and its application in 
the Occupied Territories and within the borders of the State of Israel.
68
 See G. Cvetic, “Immigration Cases in Strasbourg: The Right to Family Life Under Article 8 of the 
European Convention,” 36 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 647, 654-55 (1987); R. Cholewinski, “The 
Protection of the Right of Economic Migrants to Family Reunion in Europe,” 43 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
568, 589 (1994); H. Storey, “The Right to Family Life and Immigration Case Law at Strasbourg,” 39
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 328, 337 (1990).
69
 C. R. Howell, “The Right to Respect for Family Life in the European Court of Human Rights,” 34 U. 
of Louisville J. of Fam. L. 693 (1995-1996).
70
 See, for example: Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985) 34 (the European 
Court ruled that the right of the couple to family life was not infringed, since they were married after 
the foreign spouse had already been staying in Britain illegally, and, under these circumstances, the 
state had no obligation to grant immigration rights to the foreign spouse).  In other cases, the European 
Court found a breach of the right to family life enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention, in 
particular, when it concerns foreign nationals who have lived with their families in the “foreign” 
country for most of their lives and faced deportation because of the commission of criminal offenses.  
See, for example: Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); Beldjoudi v. France, 246 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26-28 (1992).
71 Stamka, supra note 10.
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while illegally staying in Israel, was required to leave the country for several months 
during which the Ministry of Interior would check whether this was a fictitious or a 
genuine marriage; once it was determined that the marriage was authentic, the spouse 
would then be entitled to return to Israel in order to begin the naturalization process.  
The naturalization process itself lasted many years and was preceded by a trial period 
for permanent residence, whereas the request for naturalization would only be 
discussed at the end of the trial period; this, because marriage to an Israeli, in and of 
itself, does not grant a foreigner the right to naturalization 72 (this lengthy process 
applies equally to a foreign spouse legally staying in Israel at the time that the 
marriage was performed).  This policy had been formulated as part of the discretion 
granted to the Minister of Interior by the Entry into Israel Law, 1952 (hereinafter: 
“Entry into Israel Law”) and the Nationality Law.  Contrary to the wording of 
Section 4A of the Law of Return, the Supreme Court ruled that, in view of the 
purpose of this statute (i.e., to avoid splitting up the families of mixed marriages 
among the Jews of the Diaspora and to encourage their immigration to Israel), the 
foreign non-Jewish spouse was not entitled to the rights that the Law of Return and 
the Nationality Law grant to the spouse of a Jewish immigrant (to the extent that this 
relates to citizenship by right of return), because this arrangement is intended to apply 
to the family members of Jews prior to their immigration to Israel, and not to the 
foreign spouse of a Jew who is a citizen of the State of Israel at the time of the 
wedding.  Accordingly, it was ruled that Jews who are Israeli citizens could not 
impart a right of return to their non-Jewish spouses.  In this way, the Court denied the 
foreign spouse the benefit of acquiring citizenship by right of return, which bestows 
social rights such as an “absorption package,” and the like.  However, the Court 
further ruled that the Ministry of Interior requirement, whereby the foreign spouse 
had to leave the country until the authenticity of the marriage could be determined, 
was “incompatible with the axioms of a democratic regime bent on the preservation 
of civil rights”73; this policy does not meet the test of proportionality and is therefore 
null and void.74  The Court based its ruling on the fundamental right to family life 
and, within its context, the right to marriage, as these are recognized by international 
law: 75
The Respondents did not properly weigh the individual’s right 
to marriage, and the grave harm to family life attendant upon 
the policy that they adopted for themselves.  Regarding the harm 
to a fundamental right, our colleague, Justice Dorner, has said in 
Tenufa Personnel Services case (HCJ 450/97 Tenufa Ltd. v.
Minister of Labor and Welfare, P.D. 52(2) 433), at p. 452: “As 
regards the test for selecting the means that causes the lesser harm, 
which, as stated, is not an absolute test, the selection of the means 
will be affected by the right that is infringed.  When this is a 
particularly important fundamental right, greater care will be taken 
in selecting the means that cause minimal harm, even where the 
cost of employing the means is substantial.”  We should 
remember that the present case revolves around the 
72 Id., at 763. Section 1 of the Nationality Law, which lists the different ways to acquire Israeli 
citizenship, does not count marriage to an Israeli national as one of them.
73 Id., at 783.
74 Id.
75 Id., at 781-82.
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fundamental right granted to the individual – every individual 
– to marry and to establish a family.  Needless to say, this right 
has been recognized in international conventions accepted by 
all […] Indeed, the magnitude of the right and the powerful 
radiation that shines from within it, would dictate, as if of
themselves, that the means chosen by the Ministry of Interior be 
milder and more moderate than the harsh and drastic action that it 
decided to take.  And it is hard for us not to conclude that the 
Respondents completely disregarded – or gave minimal weight 
to – these fundamental rights of the individual to marry and to 
establish a family. (emphases added).         
Insofar as it concerns the naturalization process, the Court has held that an immigrant 
who is a foreign spouse constitutes a special category and that therefore his or her 
right to citizenship “is superior to the right of others.”76 This, too, is based on the 
recognition of the fundamental right to family life.
The naturalization of a spouse is regulated by Section 7 of the Nationality Law, under 
the heading “Naturalization of Husband and Wife.”  According to this provision, 
“[t]he spouse of a person who is an Israeli national or who has applied for Israeli 
nationality and meets or is exempt from the requirements of Section 5(a) may obtain 
Israeli nationality by naturalization even if he or she does not meet the requirements 
of Section 5(a).”  The main purpose of this provision, which allows flexibility in the 
requirements for a spouse’s naturalization, is the desire to preserve the integrity of the 
family unit, and to avoid a disparity between the nationalities of the spouses.77
Nevertheless, the provision does not grant the spouse of an Israeli national automatic 
citizenship on the basis of marriage, since Section 5(b) of the statute – according to 
which naturalization is at the discretion of the Minister of Interior – also applies to 
the naturalization of a spouse.78
As Justice Cheshin explains in Stamka: 79
Section 7 of the Nationality Law upholds international 
commitments that Israel has undertaken, and according to which it 
is obligated to facilitate the naturalization of married women.  In 
the language of Article 3(1) of the Convention on the Nationality 
of Married Women: “Each Contracting State agrees that the alien 
wife of one of its nationals may, at her request, acquire the 
nationality of her husband through specially privileged 
naturalization procedures; the grant of such nationality may be 
subject to such limitations as may be imposed in the interests of 
national security or public policy.” The wording of the Convention 
expresses a will to protect the rights of women, however, 
considering the principle of equality customary in our country, it 
may be said – in principle – that this right is also granted to men.  
76 Id., at 790.
77 Id.; HCJ 754/83 Rankin v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 38(4) 113, 117 (hereinafter: “Rankin”).
78 Rankin, supra note 77, at 113; HCJ 4156/01 Dimitrov v. Minister of Interior (not yet published) 
(hereinafter: “Dimitrov”).
79 Stamka, supra note 10, at 792.
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The purpose of the statute – in Section 7 – is to protect the rights of 
the spouse, which indicates that the Minister of Interior must 
incorporate this purpose in the policy established for implementing 
the provisions of Section 7.           
Justice Cheshin further ruled that, indeed, Section 7 of the statute does not eliminate 
the discretion granted to the Minister of Interior under Section 5(b), however, it 
should be interpreted as granting special privileges based on marriage in the sense 
that the Minister should exercise the discretion granted to him by Section 7 and, in 
worthy cases, waive any of the requirements listed in Section 5(a) of the statute, 
particularly the requirement of permanent residence in Israel.80  This ruling gives 
proper substance to Section 7 of the statute, since its practical effect is to shorten the 
process by approximately six years and to significantly ease the naturalization of a 
foreign spouse. 
Thus, in Stamka, the Court saw fit to nullify the policy of the Ministry of Interior 
according to which the foreign spouse would be deported for several months in order 
to determine the authenticity of the marriage, as well as its policy stipulating that the 
hearing for a naturalization application would only commence after the obligatory 
period of time needed to grant the foreign spouse with permanent resident status had 
elapsed.  The Court based its decision on the argument that these policies were 
extremely detrimental to the fundamental right to marriage and family life, while 
expressly recognizing the state’s commitment to protect the family unit in view of the 
norms of international law in this matter.81
Even so, it would appear that the Supreme Court does not adopt a uniform stance 
concerning the fundamental right to family life in the realm of immigration law.  
Whereas, in Stamka, the Supreme Court granted a superior status to the right to 
family life, both rhetorically and in the application of the right to the facts of the case, 
it does not apply this insight to other judgments, even when rhetorically recognizing, 
in the words of Justice Cheshin, “the powerful radiation that shines” from within the 
right.  This lack of uniformity is embodied in decisions of the Supreme Court 
regarding applications for “family unification” by residents of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, i.e., applications for permission from the State of Israel to bring a non-
resident spouse into the region, so that he or she may cohabit permanently with a 
spouse who is a resident.82  In the Shahin case, the applicants, who lived in the 
80 Id., at 793.  It should be noted that, following this case, the Ministry of Interior changed its policy.  
See HCJ 338/99 Sabri v. Minister of Interior (unpublished), Takdin - Supreme Court 1999(3), 508.
81
 Following the decision in Stamka, the Ministry of Interior formulated a new procedure, in 1999, 
which shortened the period of time necessary to receive citizenship.  According to this new procedure, 
during the trial period, the foreign spouse must extend his or her temporary resident permit each year.  
After the trial period, the foreign spouse receives Israeli citizenship without the interim stage of 
permanent residence.  In this matter, the Supreme Court has recently rejected a petition in which it was 
asked to rule that the procedure for extending the permit of a temporary resident be performed every 
two years, instead of every year.  See HCJ 7139/02 Abbas-Batza v. Minister of Interior (not yet 
published; from April 1, 2003).  Nevertheless, in April 2003, the new policy of Interior Minister 
Avraham Poraz, to grant a temporary permit of stay for two years, came into effect.  See M. Mualem, 
“A sympathetic ear can make a legal difference,” Ha’aretz English Edition, April 7, 2003.
82
 See, for example, HCJ 500/72 Abu Al Tin v. Minister of Defense, P.D. 27(1) 481; HCJ 209/73 Ali 
Odeh v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 28(1) 13; HCJ 802/79 Samara v. Regional Commander of the West 
Bank, P.D. 34(4) 1; HCJ 263/85 Awad v. Commander of the Civil Administration, Ramallah District, 
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Occupied Territories, claimed that the State of Israel’s refusal to permit women 
married to residents of the region to remain in the territories with their spouses was a 
violation of the principles of international humanitarian law.83  The petitioners relied 
on Article 27 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, 1949, which states that “Protected Persons are entitled, in all 
circumstances, to respect for ... their family rights.”84  Similar protection of the right 
to family life may be found in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, of 1907, which provides that “[f]amily honor
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions 
and practice, must be respected.”85  These two provisions require that the occupier 
protect the right to family life, but it is doubtful that they also mandate family 
unification in those cases where the marriage to a foreign resident was entered into 
after the occupation, since the separation of the family requesting to be united is not 
necessarily a result of the state of war and the occupation.86
The policy of the military government in the Occupied Territories during the 1980s 
was to limit the approval of requests for family unification, since the military 
government no longer viewed such applications as authentic requests, but rather as “a 
means for immigration into the regions.”87  In order to attack this policy, the 
petitioners in Shahin relied on two legal opinions by experts in international law.  
These experts expressed their view that the military government’s refusal to permit 
family unification was in violation of aforesaid Articles 27 and 46.  According to the 
legal opinion by Prof. Brownlie of Oxford University, the State of Israel is obligated 
to grant a permit of stay and permanent residence to the foreign spouses in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, for otherwise it is harming the “unity of family life,” in 
violation of Article 27.88  Prof. Brownlie concluded that this unjustified harm to 
family life constitutes a violation of a human rights norm that applies to the State of 
Israel under customary international law.89 According to the legal opinion of Prof. 
Shelton, from the University of Santa Clara, Israel is, indeed, entitled to regulate the 
entry into and the stay of foreigners in its territory, but this prerogative should not be 
abused and must be balanced against the right of the individual to marry and to 
establish a family.90  Prof. Shelton pointed out that, in certain circumstances, 
preventing the entry of a foreigner into the territory of the state may constitute a 
violation of the right to marry and to establish a family: “The right to marry and 
found a family is generally recognized in international law and has been applied to 
P.D. 40(2) 281; HCJ 673/86 Al Saudi v. Head of the Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip, P.D. 41(3) 
138.
83
 HCJ 13/86 Adel Ahmed Shahin v. Regional Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, P.D. 41(1) 
197 (hereinafter: “Shahin”).
84
 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of August 12, 
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 (hereinafter: “Fourth Geneva Convention”).  A 
similar provision may be found in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 
1.
85
 A. Roberts and R. Guelff eds., “Hague Regulations Annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land,” Documents on the Laws of War (2nd ed., New York, 1982) 44;
U.S.T.S. 539, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90, entered into force January 26, 1910.
86
 Y. Dinstein, “Reunion of Families in the Administered Territories,” 13 Iyunei Mishpat 221, 227 
(1988) [Hebrew].
87 Shahin, supra note 83, at 214.
88 Id., at 202.
89 Id.
90 Id., at 204.
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require permitted residence in a state of which an individual may not be a national. 
Denial of family unification amounts to an abuse of right in such situations.”91
The Supreme Court rejected the conclusions reached in these legal opinions and ruled 
that both the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention “do not contain 
any explicit reference pertaining to family unification, in general, or to the right of 
foreign citizens to enter a militarily occupied area.”92  Moreover, the Court has ruled 
that “general principles have not been formulated that create a binding, general 
customary norm regarding a militarily occupied area, and no precedents have been 
established in this field which serve as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”93
Therefore, in Shahin, the Court gave very little weight, if any, to the right to family 
life as a fundamental human right grounded in principles of international law.  
Indeed, the Court did note that “family unification is always considered an important 
humanitarian matter,” but added that the treatment of these matters has always been 
“on the basis of ad-hoc arrangements specific to the circumstances of each case, 
which have varied according to the security and political conditions at the time.”94
The policy of the military government regarding family unification for residents of 
the Occupied Territories is similar, in one respect, to the Ministry of Interior policy 
within the borders of the State of Israel up to the Stamka decision.  This similarity is 
reflected in the fact that the Ministry of Interior, like the military government, has not 
viewed the marriage to a foreign spouse as a genuine marriage but rather as a 
fictitious marriage designed to enable the foreign spouse to legally remain in the 
State of Israel.  However, whereas the foreigner married to an Israeli national was 
required to leave the country for several months and was entitled to return to Israel 
afterwards and begin the naturalization process, the refusal to permit family 
unification for Arab residents of the Occupied Territories and their foreign spouses
sealed the fate of their applications and caused a grave and irreversible harm to their 
right to family life.  Moreover, and despite the similarity between the two cases, in 
contrast to Stamka – where the Court ruled that each case should be judged on its 
own merits, and that the general policy of deporting the foreigner from Israel, until 
after an examination of the authenticity of the marriage, was null and void – in 
Shahin, insofar as it concerns residents of the Occupied Territories, the Court ruled 
that a concrete, individual examination, on the merits, of each request for family 
unification based on marriage, was not required, and that the military government 
was entitled to treat this as a general “phenomenon” of mass immigration and to 
implement general measures that would apply to most requests for family unification, 
in view of the “state of war” in the Occupied Territories95; therefore, in view of the 
“general security, political and economic implications of the phenomenon, and its 
91
 Id.
92 Id., at 208.  Prof. Dinstein notes that it is puzzling that neither the petitioners nor the Court referred 
to the most relevant provision of humanitarian law in this matter, i.e., Article 74 of the First Protocol of 
1977, annexed to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, whereby: “The High Contracting Parties and the 
Parties to the conflict shall facilitate in every possible way the reunion of families dispersed as a result 
of armed conflicts …”.  Indeed, Israel is not a contracting party to the Protocol, however, it has never 
objected to the aforesaid provision in Article 74.  See Dinstein, supra note 86, at 227-28.
93 Shahin, supra note 83, at 210.
94 Id., at 209.
95 Id., at 215.
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consequences,” the Supreme Court approved the minimalist policy of the military
government.96
Regarding family unification in Israel, as opposed to family unification in the 
Occupied Territories, Justice Cheshin has said, in Stamka: 97
Pertaining to the grant of rights to the foreign spouses, the parties’ 
counsels have used the term “family unification”; however, this is 
not the correct term, and we should clarify this at the outset.  A 
distinction should be made between “family unification,” insofar 
as it relates to the Occupied Territories – and in that context, this is 
the correct term to use – and the use of the term and its application 
to the territory of the State [of Israel].  Prima facie, these matters 
are similar in nature, since both cases relate to the desire of family 
members to live together.  However, despite the (partial) 
substantive identity between “family unification” in the Occupied 
Territories and “family unification” in Israel, there is no legal 
identity: the law is different, the competent authority is different,
the nature of the right is different.  We do not intend to go into 
detail in regard to arrangements for “family unification” in the 
Occupied Territories.  Our only intention is to state that no 
inference can be made from these arrangements to the present case, 
just as no inference can be made from the present case to aforesaid 
arrangements.  Each matter is a case unto itself.
In this same judgment, Justice Cheshin added that: 98
The State of Israel recognizes the right of the citizen to choose a 
spouse according to his wishes and to establish a family in Israel 
together with that person.  Israel is committed to the protection of 
the family unit under international conventions (see Article 10 of 
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, and 
Article 23.1 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966); 
and even though these conventions do not dictate any given policy 
in the matter of family unification, Israel has recognized – has and 
does recognize – its obligation to provide protection to the family 
unit also by granting permits for family unification.  In doing so, 
Israel has affiliated itself with enlightened nations, those states that 
recognize – subject to reservations regarding national security, 
public safety and public welfare – the right of family members to 
live all together in a territory of their choosing.           
Despite the Supreme Court’s impressive rhetoric, the basic human right to family life 
– “the fundamental right acquired by the individual - every individual - to marry and 
to establish a family” – is in fact given different meanings in different contexts, such 
96 Id., at 214-15.
97 Stamka, supra note 10, at 786.  Regarding the use of the term “family unification” by the Supreme 
Court, in the context of Jewish residents of Israel, see, for example: HCJ 758/88 Kandel v. Minister of 
Interior, P.D. 46(4) 505, 518-20 (hereinafter: “Kandel”).
98 Stamka, supra note 10, at 787.
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that while a Jewish Israeli citizen has the basic right to be united with a foreign 
spouse, an Arab resident of the Occupied Territories requesting to be joined to a 
foreign spouse is at the mercy of the military government, and this right is denied 
because of one security reason or another; this was the case in 1986 (in Shahin) and 
remains the case up to this very day (the obiter dictums in Stamka).  Therefore, and to 
the extent that it relates to the Occupied Territories – as Justice Cheshin notes, “the 
nature of the right [to family life] is different.”  Still, neither in Stamka nor in Shahin
does the Supreme Court explain the different nature of the right to family life in the 
Occupied Territories, or, to be more exact: whether, apart from a declarative right, 
the residents of the Occupied Territories are granted any right whatsoever to family 
life.  It would seem that the Supreme Court has not given proper weight to the 
provisions of the first part of Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 
46 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which expressly provide that, even in a time of 
war, the right to family life of the residents of the occupied region must be respected 
(even if these provisions are not to be interpreted as requiring family unification in 
the manner requested by the petitioners); this approach is puzzling in view of the 
Court’s assumption that “Israel respects the humanitarian principles in the laws of 
war and does not rely on the applicability, or lack thereof, of the Fourth 
Convention.”99
In Shahin, the Court added that the right to family life enunciated at the beginning of 
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention must be read together with the 
reservation at the end of said provision, whereby “… the parties to the conflict may 
take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be 
necessary as a result of the war.”100  The question is whether this reservation justifies 
the occupying state’s disregard of the need to respect the rights of the residents of the 
occupied territory, rights enunciated at the beginning of the provision, especially 
considering that there must be a causal relation between the adoption of such 
measures of control and security and a state of war.  In Shahin, the respondent’s 
central argument was that “the family unification phenomenon … has become a 
complicated and problematic issue with both political and security aspects – as a 
means of immigration into the regions.”101  It is highly doubtful that this argument 
can justify a policy that automatically rejects most applications for family unification 
based on marriage to foreign nationals, except for some applications with special 
circumstances.  Furthermore, as the Court has noted in a different context, national 
security “is not a magic word and its priority does not arise in every case and under 
all circumstances, and it is not identical at all levels of security and the harm 
thereto.”102
The fundamental right to marriage, as will be discussed below, is one of the most 
basic expressions of the right to family life; it constitutes a right to establish a 
family, unlike derivative rights of lesser importance, such as the right of adult 
children to receive a permit of stay in order to live near their parents.103 Shouldn’t a 
respect for the basic human right to family life lead the courts to critically examine 
99 Shahin, supra note 83, at 206.
100 Id., at 209.
101 Id., at 214.
102
 HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense, P.D. 49(4) 94, 124.
103
 Regarding this right and its restriction, see infra, Part III.D.2; see also in this matter HCJ 1689/94 
Harari v. Minister of Interior, P.D. 51(1) 15 (hereinafter: “Harari”).
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the discretion of the competent authorities and the reasonableness of their policy, and 
to hold, for example, that the rule of choice be the opposite, i.e., a hearing for each 
application on the merits, and automatic rejection only in exceptional cases?104
Even if we accept the Court’s position – whereby, to the extent that it relates to the 
Occupied Territories, the legal right (in our case, the right to family life) does not 
need to be examined in isolation from the security background – it seems that it 
would have been appropriate for the Court to set a balance between the right of the 
State of Israel to prevent the entry of foreigners into the Occupied Territories for 
security reasons and the right of the individual to marry and to establish a family.  By 
adopting the arguments of the military government without reservations, the Court 
freed itself of the need to balance the different rights.  Such a balance could have 
been expressed, as stated above, by requiring that the military authorities individually 
examine each request on the merits.105  It is true that the provisions of the aforesaid 
conventions do not mandate that the State of Israel permit the entry of foreigners into 
the Occupied Territories, just as the state has wide discretion to prevent foreigners 
from settling in its own territory,106 however, approval of a policy that sweepingly 
prohibits the immigration of spouses into the Occupied Territories is tantamount to a 
disregard of the provisions of international humanitarian law regarding the right to 
family life.
Therefore, it is no wonder that the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has recently censured this discriminatory practice, stating that it is “… 
104
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concerned about the practice of restrictive family reunification with regard to 
Palestinians, which has been adopted for reasons of national security.”107  As such, 
the Committee has reiterated “… its recommendation [to Israel] contained in 
paragraph 36 of its 1998 concluding observations that, in order to ensure equality of 
treatment and non-discrimination, the State party undertake a review of its re-entry 
and family reunification policies for Palestinians.”108
2.  Immigration Rights Based On the Parent-Child Relationship
To the extent that it concerns recognition of the right of children to settle in the State 
of Israel by virtue of their parents being Israeli citizens, the Nationality Law grants 
citizenship on the basis of a family connection only to a child born in Israel to an 
Israeli citizen (or born abroad to a parent who, at the time, was an Israeli citizen) and 
to the spouse of an Israeli citizen.  Apart from these categories, the law does not 
expand the circle of eligibility to other family members, including children born to a 
foreign spouse within a previous marriage to a spouse who was not an Israeli 
citizen.109  The Harari case concerned two Burmese nationals who had requested 
permission to remain in the State of Israel in order to live together with their mother, 
who was an Israeli citizen.  The Harari children were 19 and 21 years old at the time 
that the petition was filed and, during their stay in Israel, their father, who lived in 
Burma, had passed away.  Accordingly, in their petition, they claimed that they had 
no other home than their mother’s home in Israel.  The policy of the Ministry of 
Interior is to not give a permit for permanent residence to a foreign adult requesting 
to be near a family member who is an Israeli national or resident, except to an elderly 
parent of an Israeli national who remains alone and isolated in his or her country of 
residence.  The Supreme Court approved the Ministry of Interior policy and ruled that 
adult children are not entitled to permanent residence in Israel by the fact that their 
mother is an Israeli national.110  The Supreme Court thus rejected the petitioners’ 
argument and held that – to the extent that it concerns adult children – the Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty does not mandate giving extra weight to the right of a 
mother and her sons to live together.  
The degree of recognition afforded to the right of a parent to settle in the State of 
Israel by virtue of the fact that his or her children are Israeli nationals has been 
deliberated more than once before the Supreme Court.  In Kandel, the petitioners 
argued, inter alia, that since their minor daughter was entitled to the visa of an oleh
107
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[the Hebrew term for a Jewish immigrant to Israel], they too were entitled to settle in 
the country on the basis of oleh status under the Law of Return, based on the 
daughter’s rights vis-à-vis the parents or the parents’ responsibilities vis-à-vis the 
daughter, as her guardians.111  The Court rejected this argument, holding that a 
minor’s right does not also encompass the rights of the parents: 112
A minor’s place is with his parents – where they reside, he shall 
reside, and not the reverse.  A minor is dependent on his parents –
the parents are not dependent upon him.  As guardians, they 
determine his place of residence – he does not determine their 
place of residence.  This category – the parents of a child eligible 
under the Law of Return – is not included in the group of persons 
eligible under Section 4A(a).             
In Dimitrov, the petitioner was a foreigner married to an Israeli national, with whom 
he had a minor daughter, born in Israel.113  After the couple had separated, and at the 
request of the petitioner’s wife, the Ministry of Interior decided that, at the 
conclusion of the divorce proceedings, the petitioner would be deported from Israel.  
The petitioner requested to continue the naturalization process on the basis of his 
marriage, but the Court rejected this argument because of the disintegration of the 
marital relationship leading up to the petition.114  Another argument raised by the 
petitioner was that the Ministry of Interior was obliged to grant him permanent 
resident status, as the father of an Israeli national, under Section 2 of the Entry into 
Israel Law.  The Ministry of Interior policy in this matter is to deny foreigners a visa 
for permanent residence in Israel, other than in exceptional cases and for special 
reasons115; in the case in question, the Ministry of Interior had decided that there 
were no special humanitarian circumstances to justify granting a permit for 
permanent residence, since the girl was in the custody of her mother and the 
petitioner would be allowed to enter Israel from time to time in order to visit her.116
The Supreme Court rejected the petition, holding that, in principle, the nationality of 
111 Kandel, supra note 97, at 518.
112 Id.
113 Dimitrov, supra note 78.
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the child does not suffice to grant permanent resident status to a foreign parent; only 
in exceptional cases, where special humanitarian circumstances exist, can a 
foreigner’s parenthood of a minor who is an Israeli national justify granting the 
parent the status of a permanent resident, but such circumstances did not exist in this 
case.117
The Bornea case involved a petition by a foreign worker illegally staying in Israel, 
whose marriage to an Israeli national had dissolved after a son was born to them; 
consequent to the breakup of the marriage, the Ministry of Interior decided to 
discontinue her naturalization proceedings.118 The petition dealt with the question of 
whether or not the naturalization proceedings of a foreign spouse should be 
terminated following the breakup of the marital relationship, when a child had been 
born to the couple, in Israel, during the period of their marriage.  In this case, too, as 
in Dimitrov, the application was based on the connection between the parent and the 
child, and not on the marital relationship that had dissolved and which had been the 
basis for the approval of the original application for temporary residence.  The 
petitioner argued, inter alia, that the right to family life establishes a right for the 
child to a relationship with both parents; and that the state authorities should take 
measures to allow for the existence of an appropriate, regular and continuous 
relationship between the child and his parents, and not to hinder it, even if one parent 
is not an Israeli national and does not have a lawful status in Israel.  The District 
Court, sitting as a court for administrative matters, interpreted the petition as a 
request to introduce a new criterion – i.e., the connection between a foreign parent 
and a child born out of a marriage to a spouse with Israeli nationality – in order to 
prevent the separation of the foreign parent from the child, even after the marriage 
had dissolved.119  In rejecting the petition, the Court held that no distinction should be 
made between the acquisition of a status based on a parental connection, under the 
Law of Return (the Kandel case), and a request for permanent residence or a grant of 
citizenship based on the same connection, under the Entry into Israel Law or the 
Nationality Law.120  The Court further ruled that the legal right and the duty of the 
parent to raise the child do not supersede the right of the state to bar the foreign 
parent from obtaining permanent residence or Israeli citizenship solely on the basis of 
the parental connection: 121
Balanced against the interest of a child’s right to live in a country 
where both of his parents reside, so that they can both fulfill their 
duties to raise him, to educate him, to nurture him, and to support 
him, are the public interests and considerations of the state –
national security, public safety, maintenance of public order, 
preservation of the character and culture of the nation, its identity, 
its Jewish and democratic nature, and even considerations of 
immigration policy based on economic and work force policy that 
will encourage the employment of the citizens and residents of the 
nation, ‘importing’ foreign laborers only when there is an absolute 
necessity.
117 Id., at para. 9 of the judgment.
118 Bornea, supra note 115.
119 Id. at para. 16 of the judgment.
120 Id. at para. 25 of the judgment.
121 Id. at para. 31 of the judgment.
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Therefore, in the conflict between the best interests of the child and the immigration 
policy of the State of Israel, the Court has held that the state interest is to be 
preferred. 
Time and again, it would seem that these and other state interests prevail over the 
right to family life, without the latter having been given the proper weight due to it 
according to its status as a fundamental constitutional right.  In Bornea, the District 
Court did not properly consider the grave harm to the best interests of the minor, the 
son of the petitioner, which resulted from the negation of her lawful status in Israel, 
and which would apparently lead to a severance in the relationship between him and 
his father.  The ruling that, in the circumstances of the case, the state interest 
supersedes the best interests of the child is puzzling, particularly in light of the 
principle laid down by the Supreme Court whereby “there is no judicial matter 
regarding minors where the best interests of the minor are not the paramount 
concern.”122  The Supreme Court has also ruled that the best interests of the child 
dictate that he or she be educated equally by both parents and not kept away from the 
father or mother, even when they live separately.123  The District Court, therefore, did 
not properly weigh the fundamental right to family life, which establishes a child’s 
right to grow up with his or her father and mother, as well as the right of parents to 
raise their children, as these rights have been recognized in both Israeli and 
international law.  To the extent that it concerns the right of parents to raise their 
children, on more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has laid down the basic 
principle whereby this is a fundamental constitutional right: 124
No one disputes that the connection of the parent to his child is not 
only a duty but that it is also a right.  The nature of this right is that 
the parents – and no one else – are entitled to fulfill the duties vis-
à-vis the minor child.  The legal right of the parent is that he, and 
nobody else, shall fulfill the duties vis-à- vis the child.  This right of 
the parents is an important constitutional right, for it constitutes an 
expression of the natural connection – “the call of blood,” in the 
words of Justice Cheshin in CA 50/55, at p. 799 – between parents 
and their children.
Furthermore: 125
It is the law of nature that a child be raised in the home of his 
father and mother: it is they who will love him, it is they who will 
nourish him, it is they who will educate him, it is they who will 
support him until he reaches adulthood.  This is the right of a father 
and a mother, and this is the right of the minor [cite omitted]. This 
right of a mother and a father has existed prior to statute and 
constitution.  The law of nature is the law within our hearts.  And 
even if these matters are stated in statute or constitution, they are 
none other than an echo of that same right from nature.  Much 
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ground water gives life to this right, and this is what sustains the 
forest of law that grows upon it.  And the law of the land shall go 
in the wake of the law of nature.
The family bond also establishes rights for the child: 126
These rights are also based on the duties of parents vis-à-vis their 
children – as expressed in written law – regarding custody, 
education, preservation of property, health, etc., as well as rights 
granted to a minor by the very fact that he is a minor, i.e., rights 
that recognize the state of the minor and his limitations and special 
needs … the duties of the parents, as defined in the Legal Capacity 
and Guardianship Law, are no longer general obligations, but 
rather duties that establish collateral rights for the child.  
Noncompliance by parents with the duties they have vis-à-vis their 
children will be met with action by the state, as the entity that 
protects the child and his interests.
In these cases, the infringement of the parent’s right to a family life with his or her 
children constitutes a grave harm, since one of the parents will be forced to sever 
himself or herself from the minor child; if the foreign parent is the custodial parent, 
then the right of the Israeli parent will be harmed; if the Israeli parent is the custodial 
parent, then the right of the foreign parent will be harmed.
These rights are also firmly enshrined in international law.127  Article 9(3) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child imposes a duty on the member states, inter 
alia, to “respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, 
except if it is contrary to the child's best interests.”  In a similar fashion, Article 10(1) 
of this Convention provides for the child’s right to reunification with his or her 
parents and obliges the member states to allow the entry of the child or his or her 
parents into the member country for the purpose of realizing this right.  Furthermore, 
Article 14(2) of the Convention imposes a duty on the member states to respect the 
rights of the child and the rights of his or her parents, and Article 18(1) requires the 
member states to “use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that 
both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the 
child.”
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the term “family life” includes 
the bond between parents and their minor children, a bond that does not cease in the 
event of a separation between the spouses: “From the moment of the child’s birth and 
by the very fact of it, there exists between him and his parents a bond amounting to 
‘family life,’ even if the parents are not then living together.”128
Moreover, and despite the fact that the European Convention does not apply to the 
State of Israel, we should mention several decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights, handed down on the basis of Article 8 of this Convention, the facts of which 
126 John Does, supra note 58, at 255. 
127 Bornea, supra note 115, at para. 28 of the judgment.
128 Berrehab v. The Netherlands 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14 (1998).
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are similar to cases that have come before the Israeli courts.  From these cases, it is 
possible to draw conclusions regarding the proper weight that should be given to the 
right to family life.  The Berrehab case concerned a Moroccan national married to a 
Dutch woman, whose daughter was born in the Netherlands.129 As in the Bornea
case, the father had been given a permit to stay based on his marriage, and when the 
couple divorced, the Dutch immigration authorities refused to extend his residence 
permit.  Subsequently, the father was deported.  The European Court based its 
decision on the existence of a continuous and permanent bond between the father and 
his daughter, ruling that the deportation violated the provisions of the Convention, 
and that the separation from the child forced on the parent constitutes a violation of 
the “right to family life,” as specified in Article 8 of the European Convention.130  In 
a similar fashion, the Ciliz case concerned a Turkish national who had received 
permanent status based on his marriage to a Dutch woman, in the Netherlands, with 
whom he had a child who was a Dutch national.131  Following the couple’s divorce, it 
was decided not to extend the husband’s permit to stay.  The petitioner argued that 
this decision prevented him from realizing his right to family life, as far as it 
concerned the relationship with his son.  The European Court accepted his petition 
and ruled, inter alia, that: 132
The essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against 
arbitrary action by the public authorities. There may in addition be 
positive obligations inherent in effective “respect” for family life… 
the instant case features both types of obligation: on the one hand, 
a positive obligation to ensure that family life between parents and 
children can continue after divorce, and, on the other, a negative 
obligation to refrain from measures which cause family ties to 
rupture.   
It would seem that the degree of recognition given to immigration rights based on 
family ties between parents and their children is weaker than the degree of 
recognition accorded to the immigration rights of a foreign spouse based on marriage.
However, it is not at all obvious why the strength of the bond between a minor and 
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his or her parent is weaker than the bond between spouses, and it seems only proper 
that the former right be accorded protection in the same manner and to the same 
degree as the latter right. 133 Since the Ministry of Interior and the courts in Israel 
have determined that the marital bond mandates the granting of a residential status in 
Israel to a foreign spouse who is in a marital relationship with an Israeli citizen, there 
is no justification for a policy negating such status when the bond is parental.  In this 
context, it is appropriate to adopt the arrangement laid down by international law, 
whereby, in the case of a separation between a couple with common children, when 
one spouse is not a citizen, the state – as part of its commitment to protect the bond 
between parent and child – undertakes to refrain from deporting the foreign parent 
and to grant him or her lawful status.
IV. The Right to Civil Marriage in Israeli Law in View of International Law
A.  The Right to Marriage and its Limitation
The right – or the “freedom” – to marry and to establish a family is a fundamental 
right of the highest order that has been recognized as a basic human right under 
international law.  Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides, inter alia, that: “Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to 
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.”  Article 
23(2) of the Covenant on Civil Rights states that: “The right of men and women of 
marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be recognized.”  Article 10(1) 
of the Covenant on Social Rights reiterates that stated in Article 23(3) of the 
Covenant on Civil Rights, whereby “… [m]arriage must be entered into with the free 
consent of the intending spouses.”  A combined reading of the provisions of these 
instruments reveals the centrality of the right to marriage in the context of the right to 
family life.  In the spirit of these documents, the State of Israel, like most western 
nations, also grants the highest degree of protection and recognition to the traditional 
nuclear family, that which is based on the heterosexual married couple and their 
children.  In this context, it should be stressed that the issue of the right to marry also 
has far-reaching economic implications (e.g., tax benefits, national insurance rights, 
pension rights, etc.); furthermore, the provision or preclusion of economic benefits is 
a central means at the disposal of the state to direct individuals towards existing 
family models preferred by society.  By granting a preferential status to the institution 
of marriage over other types of partnerships, the state expresses its position that the 
heterosexual relationship based on marriage embodies the normative family unit 
deserving of various state benefits.  However, even within this narrow framework, 
the state imposes various limitations on the right to marry.
In most western countries, as in the State of Israel, several explicit limitations on the 
right to marry are accepted as a matter of public policy.  Three such limitations relate 
to the following: a minimum age for marriage; family relations between the spouses 
(a prohibition against incestuous marriages on grounds of both consanguinity and 
affinity); and the existence of a previous marriage (a prohibition of bigamy and 
polygamy).  An additional prohibition relates to the sex of the spouses, i.e., a 
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prohibition of marriage between same-sex partners.  We will discuss each one of 
these limitations, respectively.134
Minimum Age for Marriage: Even though the specific age varies from country to 
country, a limitation on the age for marriage is accepted in most western nations and 
is based, inter alia, on the notion that “the creation of a family unit with a formal, 
binding relationship requires personal maturity, and, in a civilized society, one waits 
for the development of the personality – i.e., attributes of mind and body – before 
permitting marriage.”135  This limitation finds expression both in Article 16(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that “[m]en and women of 
full age … have the right to marry and to found a family” (emphasis added), and in 
Article 23(2) of the Covenant on Civil Rights, which states that the right to marry 
shall be granted to “men and women of marriageable age.”  In a similar fashion, 
Article 16(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women provides that “… all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to 
specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an 
official registry compulsory.”  The rationale behind these provisions is that the free 
consent of the marrying couple is a prerequisite for marriage, and that it is necessary 
to lay down a minimum age in order to ensure that this consent is, in fact, given 
freely.  Another reason is the need to guarantee stable married life and the view that 
such stability can only be guaranteed if the two spouses are mature enough to be fully 
aware of their obligations within the family context.  The aforesaid conventions do 
not specify the minimum age required, and this is with the understanding that each 
state will give substance to its obligation to set a minimum age for marriage in 
accordance with the accepted values of its own society.136
The principle of a minimum age for marriage is also enshrined in a special 
international convention designed for this specific purpose, which Israel has signed: 
the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages.  This Convention reiterates the principle expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and states, in Article 2, that: 137
States Parties to the present Convention shall take legislative 
action to specify a minimum age for marriage. No marriage shall 
be legally entered into by any person under this age, except where 
a competent authority has granted a dispensation as to age, for 
serious reasons, in the interest of the intending spouses. 
In the State of Israel, this matter is regulated by the Marriage Age Law, 1950.  Up 
until 1998, this statute specified the age of 17 as the minimum age of marriage for 
134
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women.138  For men, however, no minimum age of marriage was specified.  In order 
to address this disparity, the statute was amended so that its provisions limiting the 
marriage of young girls were applied equally to the marriage of young boys under the 
age of 17, out of the understanding that “the prevention of underage marriages is 
necessary for young boys to the same extent that it is required for young girls.”139
According to the amended statute, the performance of a marriage ceremony for a 
young boy or girl under the age of 17 constitutes a criminal offense punishable by 
two years imprisonment.  The statute does not annul the validity of underage 
marriages but rather imposes criminal sanctions on the man or woman who marries 
the young girl or boy, on those persons who perform the ceremony and on anyone 
who assists them.140  Nevertheless, Section 5 of the statute specifies two alternative 
grounds for a court to permit an underage marriage.  The first case arises in 
circumstances in which the young girl has become pregnant by or has given birth to 
the child of the person she is asking to marry, or, in the case of a young boy, when 
the woman who he wants to marry has become pregnant or has given birth to his 
child.  The second case, which also applies both to the marriage of a young boy and 
the marriage of a young girl, is when they have reached the age of 16 and, in the 
court’s opinion, there are special circumstances that justify granting such permission 
– however, the statute does not specify exactly what these “special circumstances” 
are.141  The Israeli Report to the UN Committee regarding the implementation of the 
Covenant on Social Rights indicates that, in actuality, while the percentage of 
marriages between young girls under the age of 17 and adult men averaged about 
48% between the years 1975-1979, in 1993 this number stood at about 10%; 
nevertheless, the marriage of minors in the State of Israel is still an ongoing 
phenomenon – albeit, on the decline – in spite of the Marriage Age Law and the 
criminal sanctions imposed therein.142
Prohibition against incestuous marriages on grounds of consanguinity and 
affinity: Regarding the prohibition of marriage between persons related by blood or 
marriage, it is the applicable religious law that specifies the degrees of relation 
included in the prohibition.143  Nevertheless, the prohibition is not limited to religious 
law and should not be viewed only as a religious norm, since it is accepted in all 
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civilized societies and has rational justifications that suffice on their own.144  Thus, 
for instance, one of the explanations for this prohibition is genetic, i.e., the fear that 
children born to people who are related by blood are liable to be afflicted with 
various genetic defects.145  Of course, the genetic fear does not justify prohibitions 
based on relations by marriage and, in this matter, it seems that the rationale stems 
from psychological and sociological considerations.146
Prohibition of Bigamy: The prohibition against multiple marriages is designed to 
uproot customs accepted in traditional societies that harm the status of women.147  If 
we accept the definition of the institution of marriage as a permanent, exclusive 
relationship between two spouses, not only does this restriction do no harm to the 
right to family life, but it even reinforces the right.148  Section 176 of the Penal Law 
specifies bigamy as a criminal offense, whereby: “A married man who marries 
another woman, or a married woman who marries another man, is liable to 
imprisonment for five years.”  Since matters of marriage and divorce in Israel are 
governed by religious law, the legislature cannot declare bigamous marriages as void 
when such marriages are recognized by the relevant religious law (such as in a case 
where permission has been granted by a Rabbinical Court for the second marriage of 
a Jewish man), however, the legislature does take steps to eliminate the phenomenon 
by means of criminal sanctions.149  Accordingly, Section 179 of the Penal Law states 
that the criminal prohibition does not apply to the extent that it relates to the second 
marriage of a Jew that has been performed after the husband had received permission 
to remarry from a Rabbinical Court (an option not available to a woman who is an 
agunah; literally translated as a “chained woman,” in Jewish Law, this Hebrew term 
refers to a woman bound in marriage by a husband who refuses to grant a divorce or 
who is missing and not proved dead); regarding persons who are not Jewish, Section 
180 of the Penal Law provides that a second marriage shall not be deemed a violation 
of the prohibition of bigamy if the spouse by the earlier marriage is mentally ill or has 
been missing for a period of seven years under circumstances raising a reasonable 
presumption of death.
Prohibition of Marriage between Same-Sex Partners: Up until recently, the 
institution of marriage has been defined and perceived of as being limited to the 
relationship between a man and a woman, without there having been any need for 
explicit legislation prohibiting same-sex marriages.  In the past, it was even argued 
that this was not to be viewed as a restriction on the freedom to marry, since by its 
very definition, marriage was limited to partners of different sexes.150  So far, the 
only countries that have recognized same-sex marriages are the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Canada (in Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec), and one US state 
(Massachusetts), and in other countries throughout the world there is an ongoing 
legal and public struggle for such recognition.  Many countries recognize same-sex 
couples as a family and, in differing measures, extend various provisions to them that 
144
 A. Rubinstein, “The Right to Marriage,” 3 Iyunei Mishpat 433, 437-38 (1973) [Hebrew].
145
 For a detailed account of the various arguments, see Id., at 438-39.
146
 See Shifman, supra note 35, at 186-87.
147
 See Shalev, supra note 61, at 469-70; Shifman, id., at 155 n.1. 
148
 Rubinstein, supra note 144, at 434-35.
149
 Israeli Report to the UN Committee, supra note 27, at 80.
150
 See, for example: M.A. Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and Family in the 
United States and Western Europe (Chicago, 1989) 49.
38
apply to married couples.151  The right to family life is not the exclusive domain of 
heterosexual society.  Many gays and lesbians conduct a family life for all intents and 
purposes.  Alongside the limited recognition granted by the Israeli Supreme Court to 
same-sex partnerships and the right to parenthood of gays and lesbians,152 the case 
law of the Family Court and the District Court negates such recognition.153 While 
restrictions as to the age for marriage, polygamous marriages and marriages between 
relatives are rational and desirable, the restriction of marriage to heterosexual 
partnerships is unjustified and results from prejudice against gays and lesbians.  
Nevertheless, it seems that as long as religious law exclusively governs matters of 
marriage and divorce in Israel, the legislature cannot be expected to recognize the 
rights of gays and lesbians to marry.  However, if and when the barriers to civil 
marriage are removed, as mandated by the international conventions that Israel has 
signed – so I will argue below – then their restriction to heterosexual relationships 
may be considered illegitimate discrimination that violates the principle of equality.
In addition to the first three limitations on the right to marriage discussed above (a 
minimum age, the prohibition of the marriage of relatives and the prohibition of 
bigamy) – restrictions, which, as stated, are accepted in all western nations and 
perceived of as legitimate in all civilized societies, and which are not to be viewed of 
as religious coercion – there are several additional limitations on the right to marry 
that are specific to the State of Israel.  Not only is the right to marriage not applied 
equally to all residents of the country, but there is also an inherent discrimination 
between men and women in the laws of marriage and divorce in Israel.  These 
limitations stem from the application of religious law to matters of marriage and 
divorce and from the lack of civil marriage.  In contrast to the Israeli legal situation, 
in most western nations, the transition from religious law to the regulation of 
marriage as a secular civil right had already begun in the 18th and 19th centuries, with 
the end of the church’s monopolistic jurisdiction and the introduction of civil 
marriage.154  Israel is one of the only democratic countries in the world where 
personal law is still exclusively governed by religious law.155  Section 2 of the 
Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953 (hereinafter: 
“Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law”) provides that: “Marriages and divorces of 
Jews shall be performed in Israel in accordance with Jewish religious law.”156  The 
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application of religious law to matters of marriage and divorce for Jews in Israel, and 
the lack of an option to marry in a civil marriage ceremony, constitutes a serious 
infringement of the right to family life, in general, and of the right to marriage, in 
particular.  This infringement is further aggravated by the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the religious courts in matters of marriage and divorce – institutions that completely 
exclude women.  The absence of an option for civil marriage harms three main 
groups: first and foremost, the application of religious law to matters of marriage and 
divorce constitutes a violation of the principle of equality between the sexes, since 
many religious laws discriminate against women; secondly, the lack of a civil 
arrangement for marriage also harms those persons who are unable to marry 
according to religious law (such as those persons who have no religion); thirdly, the 
religious monopoly also harms the freedom from religion of all those couples who do 
not want religious law to apply to their marriages.    
B. The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Israel: Discrimination against
Women and Additional Groups
1.  Discrimination Against Women
Religious law – all religious law – is based on a patriarchal viewpoint and 
tradition,157 and, as such, discriminates against women.  This discrimination is 
apparent, inter alia, in the subordination of women to the authority of men, in an 
unequal division of roles within the family, and in the perception that women possess 
a very limited social and personal status.158  Moreover, for Jews in Israel, the 
religious law that governs in matters of personal status is the law as interpreted by 
Orthodox Judaism, which leaves no room for a more lenient interpretation that is 
inclined to greater equality between the sexes, such as that of the Conservative or 
Reform Movements.159
To the extent that it relates to the inequality between the sexes within the context of 
the laws of marriage and divorce, the Women’s Equal Rights Law, 1951 has merely 
declarative significance.  Indeed, the purpose of this statute is “to lay down principles 
for the guarantee of full equality between men and women,”160 and, indeed, the 
statute provides that “one law shall apply to men and women regarding any legal act; 
and any statutory provision that discriminates against a woman, as a woman, 
regarding any legal act, shall not be binding”161 – however, the reservation in 
Section 5, whereby the statute “shall not affect any legal prohibition or permission 
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relating to marriage or divorce,” in effect, renders it meaningless and actually 
reinforces the discrimination against women prevailing in religious law.162
The laws of marriage and divorce regulate three different areas: (a) the manner of 
entering into a marriage, from the perspective of form and capacity; (b) the system of 
rights and duties constituting the substance of a marriage; (c) the manner in which a 
marriage is dissolved.163  In all three areas, provisions of Jewish religious law may be 
found that are discriminatory against women.164  It suffices to give several examples
from the field of divorce law applying to Jews in Israel, although similar problems 
also exist according to the religious law applying to other population groups in Israel 
(Christians, Muslims, etc.).  Discrimination against women in divorce law is 
expressed, primarily, in the fact that the grounds for divorce available to them are 
different and fewer than those available to men.  A ground of action sufficient to 
obligate a wife to accept a get [the “writ of divorce”], does not necessarily suffice to 
force the husband to deliver a get.165  This results in an asymmetry, between the 
husband and the wife, in the grounds for obligating and compelling the delivery of a 
get, something that acts to the detriment of the wife.  It should be further noted that 
the Rabbinical Courts are very reluctant to coerce a husband to deliver a get.  
Likewise, without having received a get from her husband, a woman is unable to 
obtain permission to remarry, whereas, in contrast, a husband is entitled to remarry 
by special permission of the Rabbinical Court.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has censured this 
discriminatory practice, stating that: 166
The Committee expresses concern about the fact that the Jewish 
religious courts’ interpretation of personal law with respect to 
divorce is discriminatory to women, especially the regulation that 
allows the husband to re-marry even when the wife is opposed to 
the divorce, whilst the same rules do not apply to the wife…. The 
Committee recommends that the State party undertake steps to 
modify the Jewish religious courts’ interpretation of the law 
concerning divorce to ensure equality between men and women, as 
provided for in Article 3 of the Covenant.
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Therefore, in contrast to men, women are “sentenced” to monogamy, since, 
according to Jewish Law, adultery is only forbidden to women (in the sense that a 
married woman, who has not received a get from her husband, is considered an 
adulteress if she has relations with another man).  This monogamy is imposed upon 
her all the more forcefully by the rule providing that any child born to her from a man 
who is not her husband will be considered a mamzer [the offspring of a forbidden 
union].167 Therefore, frequently, the option of a life as the reputed spouse of another 
man is also closed off to her, if she has not received a get from her husband.  In 
contrast, the husband is not exposed to any sanction if he lives with another woman 
as his reputed spouse.  Moreover, the relative bargaining power of the wife is inferior 
to that of the husband.168  The problem of aginut [the wife’s status as an agunah]
leads to a situation in which the woman is sometimes willing to make significant 
economic concessions in order to be released from an extortionist spouse.169  Matters 
are further complicated by what is known as the “jurisdictional race,” i.e., the race 
between the spouses to file suit first in the instance he or she prefers, either the 
religious court or the Family Court (generally, women prefer the Family Courts, 
while men prefer the Rabbinical Courts); this race is detrimental to the bargaining 
power of the parties, especially that of the economically weaker party, which, in most 
cases, is the wife.170
Further discrimination is reflected in the property arrangements between the spouses 
prior to the divorce.  On the subject of maintenance, despite the fact that the law 
applying in both the religious court and the Family Court is the same law – the 
personal law of the parties171 – studies by the National Insurance Institute indicate 
that the level of maintenance payments in judgments by the Rabbinical Courts is 30% 
lower than that in those handed down by the civil courts.172
The situation is no better concerning the division of property between separating 
spouses who have not made a property agreement.  According to the resources-
balancing arrangement laid down in the Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 1973, 
resources balancing only takes place upon the dissolution of the marriage as a result 
of a divorce or the death of one spouse.  This arrangement leads to a problematic 
situation potentially more harmful to women than to men, because women who are 
denied a get are unable to benefit from a resources-balancing arrangement, even 
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when the marriage has been effectively over for many years.  The later the resources 
balancing takes place, the greater the bargaining power of the husband.173
2.  Discrimination against Additional Groups
In addition to the discrimination against women resulting from the application of 
religious law in matters of marriage and divorce, several other groups are also 
discriminated against, since the exclusive application of religious law leads to a 
situation in which persons belonging to these groups are completely unable to get 
married in the State of Israel.  The groups that are harmed include, first of all, those 
persons without a religion and those persons whose religious community is not 
recognized.174  Secondly, Israeli law does not permit mixed marriages, i.e., marriages 
between members of different religious communities (except for those isolated cases 
in which the personal law of both parties recognizes such marriages175).  Under 
Jewish Law, a marriage between a Jew and a non-Jew is void ab initio.176  The third 
group includes persons disqualified for religious marriage: even when both spouses 
are Jewish, there are various prohibitions in religious law that limit their right to 
marry.  Such couples are “disqualified for marriage” because they are unable to 
marry according to the laws of the State of Israel.  The impediments to marriage may 
be classified into three categories, according to their consequences177: (a) marriages 
that are void ab initio: including, inter alia, the second marriage of a woman still 
considered to be married to her previous husband and incestuous relationships178; (b) 
doubtful marriages: cases in which there is a question as to the validity of the 
marriage, and because of this doubt (which may arise, for example, in a case of a 
private marriage or a civil marriage that has been performed abroad) the wife requires 
a get in order to remarry179; (c) prohibited marriages that are retroactively valid: this 
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category (which results in the couple being forced to divorce one another) includes, 
inter alia, the prohibition against the marriage of a Kohen [a descendant of the 
ancient priestly caste] to a divorced woman, to a chalutzah [a widow released from a 
levirate marriage] or to a convert.180  These groups include about a quarter of a 
million immigrants from the CIS (the former Soviet Union) and many Ethiopian 
immigrants, who are not Jewish or whose Jewishness is questioned by the religious 
establishment; they, too, are unable to realize their right to marry and to establish a 
family in Israel.181
These restrictions are just an example of the many limitations imposed by religious 
law, in general, and by Jewish Law, in particular.  These and other restrictions cause 
grave harm to the freedom of the couple to marry and to establish a family.  The 
solutions that exist in order to circumvent these prohibitions are limited and partial.182
In addition to the discrimination against women and other groups that results from 
the restrictions imposed by religious law, its application in matters of marriage and 
divorce also does harm to the freedom from religion of those Israeli citizens who do 
not want religious law to govern their personal status.  The imposition of religious 
restrictions that entail the jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts and the application of 
religious law in matters of marriage and divorce is incompatible with freedom of 
conscience and freedom from religion.183  Freedom of conscience and religion dictate 
that the individual has the legal and practical option to realize his or her rights –
including the right to marriage – without being compelled to rely on religious norms, 
religious ceremonies and religious authorities.184
C.  The Freedom to Marry without Discrimination – International Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil Rights and the 
Covenant on Social Rights all recognize the right to marry as a fundamental right.185
Moreover, these three instruments lay down the principle of equality of rights 
between the sexes within the context of the institution of marriage, in the three areas 
discussed above: the creation of the marriage, the duties and rights during married life 
and the dissolution of the marriage.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides, at the end of Article 16(1), that the spouses “are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.”  The Covenant on Civil Rights also 
provides for equality of rights within the context of marriage; according to Article 
180
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23(4) of the Covenant, “States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate 
steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution.”  In the Covenant on Social Rights, the requirement of 
equality of rights between the spouses arises both from Article 2(2), which provides 
that the rights enunciated in the Covenant be exercised without discrimination of any 
kind, including discrimination on the basis of sex, and from Article 3, which states the 
principle of equality between the sexes as follows: “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of 
all economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the present Covenant.”  Another 
convention that also provides for equality of rights between the sexes within the 
context of the institution of marriage is the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women.  Article 16(1) of this Convention provides as 
follows:186
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage 
and family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into 
marriage only with their free and full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at 
its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective 
of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all 
cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the 
number and spacing of their children and to have access to the 
information, education and means to enable them to exercise 
these rights;
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to 
guardianship, wardship, trusteeship and adoption of children, 
or similar institutions where these concepts exist in national 
legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be 
paramount;
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including 
the right to choose a family name, a profession and an 
occupation;
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the 
ownership, acquisition, management, administration, 
enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of charge 
or for a valuable consideration.
In addition to the explicit prohibition of discrimination between the sexes within the 
context of marriage, these three instruments also provide for the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of national origin, race and religion: Article 2(2) of the 
Covenant on Social Rights specifies an open list of prohibitions against 
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discrimination (“or other status”); Articles 2(1) and 26 of the Covenant on Civil 
Rights lay down a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin “or other status”; and Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that the right to marry shall not be limited “due to race, nationality or 
religion.”
These conventions do not define the nature of the marriage ceremony that is the 
subject of the right or the nature of the law that applies to marriage.  In fact, in the 
wording of the international conventions, we did not find an explicit requirement for 
the implementation of civil marriage.  Nevertheless, since these conventions forbid 
discrimination on the basis of sex, national origin, race and religion in the 
implementation of the right to marriage, they should be interpreted as indirectly 
forbidding the exclusive application of religious law in matters of marriage and 
divorce.  In the General Comment of the Committee on Human Rights of 1990, the 
Committee expressly noted that “the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion implies that the legislation of each State should provide for the possibility of 
both religious and civil marriages” (emphasis added).187  If that is the case, then the 
implementation of the provisions of the conventions necessitates the grant of a right 
to marriage without discrimination of any kind whatsoever.188  Therefore, the word 
“marriage” in the aforesaid conventions should be interpreted as referring to civil 
marriage.
D. The Laws of Marriage and Divorce in Israel in View of International Law
The laws of marriage and divorce in the State of Israel are incompatible with the 
fundamental human right to marry and to establish a family as recognized and 
accepted in the international sphere.189  Israeli law in matters of marriage and 
divorce, therefore, gravely harms the possibility for many people to fully realize their 
right to family life.  This law leads to an inequality in the legal status of men and 
women, and imposes arbitrary restrictions on various groups in the population, 
discriminating against them on the basis of religion, national origin and race.
The ways in which the State of Israel restricts the right to marriage and infringes on it 
by applying religious law, as mentioned, are as follows: (a) negation of the right to 
marry for persons without a religion and members of unrecognized religious 
communities; (b) restriction of the possibility for mixed marriages between spouses 
of different religions; (c) restriction of the right to marry for persons disqualified for 
religious marriage; and (d) a violation of the equality between women and men 
within the context of the institution of marriage.
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The question, therefore, is to what degree is Israel in breach of the provisions of 
Article 16(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 2(1) and 26 of 
the Covenant on Civil Rights, and Article 2(2) of the Covenant on Social Rights – to 
the extent that it concerns the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of 
national origin, race and religion; and the provisions of Article 16(1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 23(4) of the Covenant on Civil 
Rights, Articles 2(2) and 3 of the Covenant on Social Rights, and Article 16(1) of the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women – to the extent that 
it concerns the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex. Regarding 
Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it had been argued that 
Israel is in breach of this provision only in those cases where the right to marry has 
been completely denied to certain groups (persons without a religion and members of 
unrecognized religious communities), i.e., it was claimed that the prohibition of 
discrimination should only attach to the subjects of the right – men and women – and 
not to the right itself.190  This interpretation is unacceptable, since it is incompatible 
with the wording of Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is 
liable to render the provision meaningless.191  As for Article 16(1) of the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and Article 23 of the Covenant 
on Civil Rights, the State of Israel has given notice that it has reservations regarding 
these provisions, insofar as it concerns their incompatibility with the personal law 
binding upon the religious communities in Israel.  These reservations run contrary to 
the subject matter and purpose of the conventions – the prevention of discrimination 
against women, even under the laws of personal status.192  Undoubtedly, in view of 
the aforesaid international instruments, any kind of discrimination in granting the 
right to marriage – on the basis of race, national origin, ethnicity, religion and sex – is 
a breach of international commitments by the State of Israel.  Therefore, it is not only 
the denial of the right to certain groups that constitutes a breach of the conventions 
that Israel has signed, but also its restriction for religious reasons, like the 
arrangements that discriminate against women in the context of the institution of 
marriage – all of these constitute illegitimate discrimination that gravely harms the 
individual’s right to marry.193  The aforesaid international instruments also provide 
for the right of equality between the spouses, not only in the creation of the marriage, 
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but also in its dissolution; therefore, the right to freely marry (freedom from the 
restrictions of religious law, in other words, the right to civil marriage) also includes 
the right to civil divorce.
The conclusion is that the State of Israel is in breach of both the prohibition against 
discrimination between men and women, as well as prohibitions against 
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin and religion, during all three 
stages of marriage: its creation, its content and its dissolution.  As stated, the right to 
marriage under international law should be interpreted as referring to the 
implementation of civil marriage.  It is true that many countries that have signed 
these conventions recognize marriages that have been performed according to 
religious law, however, except for Israel, all western nations that have signed the 
conventions grant such recognition alongside and in addition to the option of civil 
marriage.  Moreover, the law that governs in these countries, both during the 
marriage and for the purpose of its dissolution, is the civil law.  Accordingly, there is, 
in fact, nothing illegitimate in the recognition of religious marriage as an additional
way to form the marital bond, provided that the state (also) grants its citizens the right 
to civil marriage.     
Ostensibly, it could be argued that the right to civil marriage, like other rights 
enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights, is not an absolute but rather a relative 
right, since Article 4 of this Covenant provides that the member states are entitled to 
limit the rights enunciated therein by law “in so far as this may be compatible with 
the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare 
in a democratic society.”  Therefore, prima facie, the State of Israel could claim that, 
by implementing marriage according to religious law, it is limiting the right to civil
marriage lawfully and in accordance with the Covenant.  Such a claim would be 
untenable, for several reasons.  Firstly, the relativity of the rights is expressed in their 
cost, and the principle of equality between the sexes is not diminished because of the 
relativity of the right.  That is to say, the responsibility of the member states to 
implement the rights is dependent on the amount of resources at their disposal194 –
which, as stated, has no relevance concerning the nature of marriage.  Secondly, the 
Committee for the Implementation of the Covenant on Social Rights has interpreted 
Article 4 very narrowly.195  Thirdly, even if such a claim was accepted, then, as 
stated, the right to civil marriage arises from several other conventions that Israel has 
signed (the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women196). 
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Being well aware of the cultural, economic and social differences between various 
nations, both the Covenant on Social Rights and the Covenant on Civil Rights set 
forth minimum standards of respect for human rights binding upon the states that 
have signed these conventions.197  International law, therefore, tries to achieve a 
consensus in regard to such a minimum standard for the recognition of basic social 
and civil rights, as reflected in the conventions regulating these matters.198  These 
conventions specify the lowest threshold for the degree of protection required of the 
states in the socio-political realm.  Of course, the member states should aspire to the 
widest possible protection in these areas, but the states are not entitled to settle for 
less protection than that specified in the conventions.  The lowest threshold, or the 
“minimum core”,199 of the right to family life is the right to freely marry, and if we 
interpret “marriage” as “civil marriage,” as I have proposed, then a state that does not 
grant its citizens the freedom to marry in a civil ceremony is in breach of the 
provisions of the Covenant on Civil Rights and the Covenant on Social Rights, as 
well as the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women.  As to the pace and time for implementing the rights enunciated in the 
conventions, it is customary to differentiate between the Covenant on Civil Rights 
and the Covenant on Social Rights, since the former imposes obligations on the state 
that must be fulfilled immediately, while the latter sets standards that the state must 
aspire to realize, and whereas for some of the rights – those rights the implementation 
of which entails an investment of resources – the pace of implementation may be 
progressive.  However, where it is possible to grant the right without a need for 
resources – even when it is enunciated in the Covenant on Social Rights – it must be 
granted immediately.200  Various aspects of the right to family life require the 
allocation of resources, such as the right of the family to social security and means of 
subsistence, while others, such as the right to be a parent (in its negative sense), do 
not impose any economic burden on the state.  As stated, the right to marriage is both 
a civil and a social right, and a change in its manner of implementation (replacing 
religious marriage with civil marriage, or introducing civil marriage alongside 
religious marriage) does not necessitate an investment of resources.  Accordingly, for 
this right, there is no reason to apply the progressive principle specified by the 
Covenant on Social Rights, and it should be dealt with as mandated by the Covenant 
on Civil Rights: by the absolute and immediate adoption of the measures necessary 
for its implementation.        
A different question is whether there is a need for a legislative reform or whether an 
Israeli court has the authority to invalidate the current arrangement regarding matters 
of marriage and divorce.  First of all, the right to freely marry in the State of Israel 
should be recognized as a part of the right to “human dignity and liberty” enshrined 
in the Basic Law of the same name.  In the words of Prof. Rubinstein: “From the 
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perspective of the values of the state as a democratic country, it is hard to see what 
proper purpose is served by forcing the Jewish citizens of the state to be subject to 
Jewish Law in matters of marriage and divorce.”201  Nevertheless, in this context, it is 
not necessary to resolve the conflict between the values of the State of Israel as a 
democratic country and its values as a Jewish state, since the “validity of laws” 
provision in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty precludes Section 1 of the 
Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction Law from being declared unconstitutional.  Moreover, 
on more than one occasion, the Supreme Court has ruled that the solution of the 
problem of the right to marriage in the State of Israel is out of its hands: 202
It is obvious to anyone who follows the Knesset’s work and the 
positions of the various political parties that this issue is a major 
bone of contention among the Israeli public, and that there has not 
yet been a decision, with proper legal form, to introduce civil 
marriage.  And who are we, as judges ordered to distance ourselves 
from all political debate and argument, to take the place of the 
legislature and to decide on a question that divides the public?
Furthermore: 203
With all due respect to the struggle of the Petitioners and those 
groups that think like them regarding their right to marry in a non-
religious context, their claim should be addressed to the proper 
[authority] – the legislature.  There is no solution for their problem 
other than by means of civil marriage performed by the state 
without any consideration for the religious affiliation (or lack 
thereof) of the parties.  The courts should not be asked to resolve 
this problem.  
In Efrat, Justice Barak, has ruled that: 204
In Israeli society, there is no consensus on this issue, and the Court 
cannot be expected to decide pronouncedly one way or the other.  
The Court crystallizes public policy as it is reflected, from its own 
objective perspective.  Unequivocal decisions in this sensitive 
matter can only come from non-judicial entities.  There are those 
who believe that the solution to the problem is the introduction of 
civil marriage … others believe that the solution is to be found in 
the field of Jewish law itself … in any event, the Court itself
cannot and should not resolve the basic problem.  The Court 
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should not be expected to order the introduction of civil marriage, 
and the Court has consistently refused to do so.    
In view of these rulings, it would seem that the demand for the introduction of civil 
marriage in the State of Israel should be directed at the legislature.205 However, it is 
highly doubtful that in the current Israeli political framework the legislature will be 
inclined to provide a comprehensive arrangement for civil marriage.  At present, the 
apparent trend is a compromise whereby a quasi-marriage institution (a “partnership 
registry”) will be introduced that will only solve the problem of persons disqualified 
for religious marriage in Israel.
V.  Conclusion
International law recognizes the right to family life as a fundamental right of 
paramount importance.  The courts in Israel have also recognized the right to family 
life as a fundamental constitutional right.  However, as we have seen, in various 
contexts, proper weight has not been given to this basic right.  The absence of a clear, 
standard definition for the “family” and the exclusion of “alternative” family bonds 
leads to an infringement of the rights of many who, in practice, conduct a family life.  
Thus, for instance, only married heterosexual couples are entitled to adopt a foreign 
child together and only a man and a woman who are a couple are entitled to use the 
services of a surrogate mother – as a result, the right to parenthood of unmarried 
couples (or couples who are not reputed spouses), including that of same-sex couples, 
is limited.  Moreover, we have found a disparity in the manner of implementation of 
the right to family life between Jewish Israeli citizens, on the one hand, and Arab 
Israeli citizens and Arab residents of the Occupied Territories, on the other hand.  
This discrimination is primarily expressed in regard to the right to immigrate to the 
State of Israel based on family ties and the right of residents of the Occupied 
Territories to “family unification.”
The most severe limitation on the right to family life within the borders of the State 
of Israel relates to the lack of an option to marry in a civil ceremony.  While 
international law recognizes the imposition of certain limitations on the freedom to 
marry (the age for marriage, prohibitions regarding incest and bigamy), the additional 
limitations on the right to marry, imposed by Israeli law, constitute a breach of 
international commitments by the State of Israel.
Making the right to marriage conditional on compliance with the requirements of a 
substantive religious law that does not recognize the marriages of persons without a 
religion, marriages between members of different religious communities, and even 
certain cases of marriage between members of the same religion, and which further 
lays down precepts that discriminate against women, is undoubtedly a violation of the 
provisions of the international conventions and instruments discussed in this article.  
The only way to ensure equality within the family context in Israel, and by so doing 
to guarantee the right of every person to marriage free of the fetters of religious law, 
is by legislative reform that would permit civil marriage.  The proper arrangement 
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would specify civil law as the exclusive substantive law applying in matters of 
marriage and divorce, and would allow a choice between a civil marriage ceremony 
and a religious marriage ceremony.
